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ABSTRACT 
Title : Mechanism and Rationality: The Case for 
Explanatory Incompatibilism. 
Candidate: Francis Xavier Williamson 
This thesis is an attempt to defend explanatory 
incompatibilism, the view that mechanistic and intentional 
explanations of behaviour are incompatible, against various 
sorts of objections which come in the form of rival 
compatibilist theories. 
In the first chapter the author outlines the prima facie case 
for explanatory incompatibilsm. This prima facie case is 
then bolstered by a discussion of explanation in general, 
conditions of compatibility for different explanations of the 
same phenomenon, and then a more rigorous account of 
mechanistic and intentional explanations which allows for a 
formal presentation of an argument for their incompatibility. 
Chapters Two, Three and Four discuss some of the 
combatibilist theories which have been advanced. 
Chapter Two involves a discussion of the "Double-Language" 
version of compatibilism as advocated by Ryle and Melden. 
This version is rejected for two main reasons: 
(1) it fails to keep the two sorts of explanation 
sufficiently apart so as to render them compatible, and 
(2) it fails to show that intentional explanations are not a 
I 
species of causal explanation. 
Chapter Three attempts to deal with the "Instrumentalist" 
version of compatibilism as advanced by Daniel Dennett. This 
is rejected because it fails to provide a rich enough account 
of rational action and it also leads to epiphenomenalism. 
In Chapter Four the author discusses the "Physicalist" 
approach to the question of compatibility as advocated by 
Alvin Goldman and Donald Davidson. But this version of 
compatibilism is found to be wanting because it also leads to 
the epiphenomenalism of the mental. 
Chapter Five, the conclusion, summarises the basic argument 
and attempts to develop the author's own account of what the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for intentional action 
are. This is found to involve· three main elements: physical 
indeterminism, intentional intelligibility, and then 
something like the concept of agent-causation. In the course 
of this account there is a brief discussion of the problem of 
other minds and an argument against the desire-belief model 
of action and its explanation based on its inability to cope 
with the problem of deviant causal chains. It is concluded 
that mechanistic and intentional explanations are indeed 
incompatible and something is said about the broad 
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INTRODUCTION 
The central core of any libertarian conception of human 
action is and always has been the view that physical 
indeterminism is somehow required if we are to be free agents. 
But it has also always been obvious that mere indeterminism 
is not enough if it were then our actions would be as free 
as the random meanderings of some quantum particle (assuming 
of course, as I will thoughout this discussion, that quantum 
phenomena are genuinely rather than a merely epistemically 
indeterministic), and this is not a freedom worth wanting, and 
certainly not a freedom upon which to base our attributions of 
moral blame and praise. 
One recalls A.J. Ayer's classic statement of the dilemma 
faced by libertarians: 
Either it is an accident that I choose to act as t 
do or it is not. If it is an accident, then it is 
merely a matter of chance that I did not choose 
otherwise; and if it is merely a matter of chance 
that I did not choose otherwise, it is surely 
irrational to hold me morally responsible for 
·choosing as I did. But if it is not an accident 
that I chose to do one thing rather than another, 
then presumably there is some causal explanation 
of my choice: and in that case we are led back to 
determinism (1982:18). 
In the light of this dilemma, many believers in free action 
have opted for some or other version of compatibilism, ·the 
view, namely, that our being free and responsible agents is 
compatible with each and every one of our actions being 
causally determined by antecedent states of the world, 
whether these be mental events in our minds or physical 
events in our brains. 
1 
.. 
But some incompatibilists, those who believe in free action 
and also believe that this is incompatible with physical 
determinism, have been unmoved by this. Instead they have 
attempted to pass through the horns of Ayer's dilemma by 
developing an account of free action which espouses physical 
indeterminism but nevertheless shows that our actions are not 
simply random, but that they in fact are intelligible and 
explicable in the light of teleological or purposive ways of 
understanding and talking about human behaviour. But it is 
not that free action is thought of as being physically 
undetermined and also teleologically intelligible, but rather 
that it in some sense has to be physically undetermined in 
order to be so intelligible. The view is that physically 
deterministic ways of understanding human behaviour are 
incompatible with that behaviour also being understood as the 
purposive and rational activity of agents who can be held 
morally accountable for their deeds. 
The core of this entire dissertation-is to defend the vi-ew 
that mechanistic explanations o-f beh~viour, at least insofar 
as they are complete explanations, are incompatible with that 
behaviour being thought of as rational action. 
Following Gary Watson (1982:12) I refer to this view as 
explanatory incompatibilism as opposed to the older 
modal incompatibilism which seeks to show that freedom is 
opposed to causal necessitation. 
In the first chapter I present what I take to be the prima 
facie grounds for asserting explanatory incompatibilism, and 
I then go on to give a brief account of explanation in 
general and the various ways in which different explanations 
could be compatible. I also offer an account of what 
2 
mechanistic and intentional (teleological or purposive) 
explanations are and I present a formal argument for 
explanatory incompatibilsm. 
The following three chapters - the core of the discussion -
are all attempts to defend explanatory incompatibilism 
against certain sorts of objections. The conclusion is 
reached that none of these objections stand up to critical 
scrutiny, and that they all, in one form or another, can only 
show that mechanism - complete mechanistic explanations of 
all our behaviour ~ is compatible with 'free agency' by 
denying that our mental lives make a causal difference to the 
way our bodies behave. 
In the cone 1 us ion I present the germ of a view of how 
physical indeterminism can accomodate the fact, if such it 
be, that our actions, far from being chance-like events, can 
be the responsible actions of free and rational agents. 
I do not address the complex issue of moral responsibility, 
action and blame in any direct way, for the discussion is 
rather concerned with the formal compatibility of mechanism 
and agency, but the relevance of the view I develop to these 
issues will be readily apparent. 
Needless to say, there are many issues which bear on this 
complex topic which have been ignored or left out entirely. 
But if the core of the thesis is correct, as I am convinced 
it is, then I see no way of denting these libertarian and 
explanatory incombatibilist claims. Mechanism is a threat to 
our view of ourselves as free and responsible agents, and if 
that vi.ew of ourselves is to survive, then it can only do so 
3 
on the condition that mechanism is false. I hope to show in 
this dissertation that there are good grounds, good 





1.1 Mechanism and Agency. 
Common sense, it seems, has always found something in the 
experience of our own rational agency which is incompatible 
with the view that we are mere mechanisms, in however 
extended and complicated a sense this may be. 
Underlying this vague but pervasive conviction is the view, 
or cluster of views, that the verification of a comprehensive 
mechanistic theory of all behaviour would in some way be in 
conflict with our view of ourselves as responsible agents who 
are the bearers of values, choices and goals. Would not all 
talk of agents, actions and responsibility be relegated to 
the scrapheap of discredited and outmoded ideas in much the 
same way as advances in science have cast to the wayside 
concepts such as phlogiston, vital spirit and the ether? As 
Stephen Toulmin has expressed the worry: .. 
For, then, every step forward in the neurological 
analysis of brain-mechanisms will shrink the area of 
operation within which mind and thought, mental 
and rational categories, have any application. Like 
the God of the natural theologians, the Human Reason 
will find itself on a diminishing sandbank, with the 
tide of Science rising all around it (1970:1-2. His 
e_mphas is ) . 
dne obvious way in which the thesis of mechanism threatens 
responsible agency - and this emerges clearly from the vast 
literature on free will - is in the formidable deterministic 
implications which such a comprehensive mechanistic theory 
5 
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would seem to hold. And even if such a mechanistic theory 
should turn but to be fundamentally indeterministic or 
2 
probabilistic - as it has every chance of doing - there 
remains the problem of justifying our attributions of moral 
responsibility and its allied institutions when it is a 
matter of chance that a person chose or acted one way rather 
3 
than another. But a further and perhaps more fundamental way 
in which mechanism threatens agency is that it seems to 
undermine the applicability of the entire framework in which 
talk of action, agency and responsibility makes sense. For 
it seem that whenever a mechanistic account of some 
particular piece of human or animal behaviour is available, 
then any intentional or purposive explanation is rendered 
otiose or ruled out altogether. 
Suppose we seek an explanation for a piece of human behaviour 
4 
which we have characterised as the raising of an arm. We 
1. I do not wish to boldly assert that determinism is 
incompatible with free agency, but only call 
attention to the fact that it is pre-philosophically 
perceived to be such. Besides this, even though the 
whole 'compatibilist' debate is far from conclusive, 
there is at least one sense of free agency, viz. 
freedom of indifference, which is incompatible with 
determinism. 
2. No pun intended. But see for instance Suppes 1974 
as well as the numerous articles which claim that 
quantum indeterminacy is here to stay and that it is 
likely to affect our basic account of brain-function. 
See Popper and Eccles 1983; Eccles 1984; Swinburne 1986 
and 1986A. 
3. This problem has been almost universally acknowledged if 
one is to judge by the frequency of its mention in the 
literature. Van Inwagen (1983) calls this the Mind 
Argument for compatibilism because of the frequency of 
its appearance in that journal. See Ayer 1982:18; 
D.J. O'Connor 1971:57-58; Chisholm 1982:27-28; 
Watson 1982:1-14; Flew:ll7-120. 
4. This is an adapted version of essentially the same 
example used by Dennett 1973:159. 
6 
would normally proceed by citing the motives, reasons or 
purposes the agent had in behaving as he did, assuming, of 
course, that it was not raised by someone else or by the 
5 
agent's other arm. We might say that he was signalling the 
waiter, or waving to a friend, or brushing away a fly, in 
which case we would have offered an intentional explanation 
of the behaviour, regarding it as the purposive action of an 
agent. But suppose a neurophysiologist informs us that in 
fact the extensor muscles in the man's arm were contracted by 
nerve impulses triggered by a freak epileptic discharge in 
the man's brain. We would, no doubt, abandon our original 
intentional explanation of the behaviour and come to regard 
it as a mere event or movement, as something which happened 
to the man rather than as something which he did. 
The mechanistic explanation of the behaviour seems to 
disqualify or displace the intentional or purposive account; 
indeed, it seems to disqualify the behaviour from being 
thought of as an action at all, and this is.because the 
behaviour has apparently been shown to bear no relation -
neither logical nor causal - to any purposes or intentions of 
any agent whatsoever, but is simply a motion of a portion of 
his body. 
It might naturally be objected that a simple example like this 
can be notoriously misleading, for it seems quite obvious 
that movements caused by epileptic discharges and the like 
are not plausible candidates for characterisation as 
purposive action. We should, in all fairness, consider the 
5. Assuming, that is, that it is a 'basic action' and not 
something done by doing something else. See Danto 1965. 
7 
case where the mechanistic explanation is far more detailed 
and complex, stretching as it were into the higher and 
remoter - perhaps more 'rational' - regions of the brain. We 
should consider the case where the scientists hand us twenty 
volumes of fine-print detailing neuronal pathways and 
cortical structures - "Here, this is how and why the arm went 
6 
up". What then? Would this incline us towards the 
conclusion that the behaviour after all can be the intentional 
action of an agent? It is difficult to see what difference 
this wou 1 d make. At 1 east it is not obvious that adducing 
more detailed and complex physical causes changes the moral 
of the example. In either case the behaviour has apparently 
been shown to be the inexorable (or random) outcome of a 
series of mechanistic causes which leaves no room for the 
causal efficacy of the reasons or intentions of any agent and 
it seems intuitively certain that these must be causally 
efficacious in bringing the behaviour about if it is to be 
7 
considered as genuine action. 
It is precisely in this sense that we do not regard missiles, 
clocks and computers as agents capable of reason and purpose 
who can be held morally accountable for their actions, and 
the reason is not that they are somehow incapable of acting 
otherwise than they in fact do - they could just as well be 
thoroughly indeterministic systems - nor is it simply that 
they lack that mysterious property called consciousness. The 
reason rather is that they simply are not capable of action 
at all. The whole explanatory framework of purpose, reason, 
action and agency is in some way inapplicable to these 
6. This is what Dennett (1973:173) suggests we do. 
7. We shall come back to this point repeatedly. 
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sorts of systems, except perhaps in a reduced and 
8 
metaphorical sense, because their behaviour proceeds from an 
antecedent series of 'blind' mechanistic causes and not from 
any reasons or intentions which are the mark of genuine 
agency and action. It would appear, then, that the 
verification of a mechanistic theory of human behaviour would 
show the same about us, that contrary to our usual and 
cherished beliefs, our behaviour proceeds from a similar 
sequence of mechanistic causes amongst which our intentions 
and goals are sadly not to be counted, having at most an 
impotent and epiphenomenal existence alongside the 
mechanisms which are the 'real' determinants of our 
behaviour. And this idea is not only counter-intuitive but 
deeply disturbing too. As Thomas Nagel has expressed it, " 
something in the idea of agency is incompatible with actions 
being events, or people being things .... Eventually nothing 
remains which can be ascribed to the reponsible self, and we 
are 1 eft with nothing but a portion of the larger sequence of 
events, which can be deplored or celebrated, but not blamed 
or praised" (1979:34). 
The problem, of course, is as old as philosophy itself. In 
its most fundamental form it consists in finding a way to 
reconcile what seem to be two incompatible intuitions about 
ourselves and the world we live in: on the one hand there is 
the undeniable fact of our own rational agency, and on the 
other hand is the intuition that as flesh and blood creatures 
inhabiting this physical world there can be no upper limit to 
what a mechanistic science of man might reveal about the 
8. Charles Taylor 1964:54-71 and also R. Taylor 1966: 238-
243. 
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physical mechanisms which underlie all our behaviour. 
P 1 ato can be said to have discussed it in the famous passage 
in the Phaedo where Socrates, in the course of levelling an 
attack on the materialism of Anaxagoras, talks about the 
'real' causes of his sitting in prison awaiting execution: 
As I read on I discovered that the fellow made no use 
of the Mind and assigned to it no causality for the 
order of the world, but adduced causes like air and 
ether and water and many other absurdities. It 
seemed to me that he was just about as inconsistent 
as if someone were to say " The cause of everything 
that Socrates does is Mind" and then, in trying to 
account for my several actions, said first that the 
reason why I am lying here now is that my body is 
composed of limbs and sinews, ... and the sinews are 
capable of contraction and relaxation, ... and since 
the bones move freely at their joints, the sinews by 
relaxing and contracting enable me to somehow bend 
9 
my limbs; and that is the cause of my sitting here in a 
bent position ..• never [troubling] to mention the 
real reasons; which are that since Athens has thought 
it better to condemn me, therefore I for my part have 
thought it better to sit here, and more right to stay 
and submit to whatever penalty she orders - because, 
by Dog! I fancy that these sinews and bones would have 
been in the neighbourhood of Megara or Boeotia long 
ago ... if I did not think that it was more right and 
honourable to submit to whatever penalty my country 
orders rather than take to my heels and run away 
(98B-99D:l56-157). 
Plato goes on to admit that the "sinews and bones" have 
something to do with his sitting in prison, but denies that 
such an account could ever be complete: 
If it were said that without such bones and sinews 
and all the rest of them I should not be able to 
do what I think is right, it would be true; but to 
say that it is because of them that I do what I am 
doing, and not through choice of what is best ... 
would be a very lax and inaccurate form of expression 
(990:157). 
Plato's 'solution' to the problem, as is well known, was a 
9. For an interesting discussion of this passage and its 
place in the history and development.of the mind-body 
problem see Popper and Eccles 1983:169-170. 
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radical dualism in which the mind (with its reasons and 
intentions, etc.) belonged to a different immaterial world 
which somehow inhabited the body, essentially the same 
'solution' that was to emerge with Descartes. Now I do not 
want to embark on a historical survey of the development of 
the mind-body problem - enough has surely been written about 
10 
that - but only offer, in this chapter at least, an account 
of what seem to be the prima f acie grounds for asserting that 
there is an incompatibility between genuine agency and the 
possibility of unlimited success in our ability to offer 
exhaustive mechanistic explanations of all behaviour. And 
the central idea behind the thesis of incompatibilism is the 
view that whenever a mechanistic explanation of some 
particular piece of human behaviour is available, then any 
intentional or purposive explanation of that behaviour is 
rendered otiose or ruled out altogether. 
Considerations such as these have led some recent 
philosophers to claim that mechanistic explanations of 
behaviour are incompatible with intentional explanations of 
that same behaviour, in the sense that the two sorts of 
explanation cannot both be held to be true accounts of a 
single instance of behaviour. Consider Alasdair Mac!ntyre's 
claim that "human behaviour can only be understood in terms 
of such disctinctive concepts as purpose, intention, 
consciousness, rational.ity, morality and language. And these 
concepts rule out the possibility of causal explanation in 
the sense in which mechanical explanations are causal 
explanations" (1960:91). Or consider his earlier statement 
10. See Popper and Eccles 1983; Shaffer 1968; McGinn 1982. 
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that "to show that behaviour is rational is enough to show 
that it is not causally determined in the sense of being the 
effect of a set of sufficient conditions ... ( 19 57: 35). A 
more extensive defence of what has been variously referred to 
as "the conflict thesis" (Flew 1978), "the rivalry thesis" 
(Charles Taylor 1985A) or, as I shall call it, "explanatory 
incompatibilism" is to be found in Norman Malcolm's "The 
Conceivablilty of Mechanism" where he argues that the 
verification of a comprehensive neurophysiological theory of 
behaviour would "refute" our ordinary purposive or 
intentional explanations. 
I take it, then, that there is a prima facie case for 
asserting explanatory incompatibilism, and my aim in the next 
two sections of this chapter is to see what lies behind these 
claims and to see whether a mom rigorous account can be 
offered of not only what these claims come to, but also of 
what these two warring sorts of explanations basically are. 
12 
1.2 Explanation 
The previous section sketched what seem to be the prima f acie 
grounds for explanatory incompatibilism. What this thesis 
amounts to is the claim that when and wherever a mechanistic 
explanation of some piece of behaviour is available, then any 
intentional expl~nation of that behaviour is ruled out or 
rendered entirely otiose. I have until now spoken somewhat 
loosely of mechanistic and intentional (or purposive) 
explanations as though these types of explanation were 
clearly defined and well understood, so it is now. my aim to 
provide a more specific account of what exactly these two 
forms of explanation are and how they differ. But before 
doing that, let me take a brief· look at explanation in 
general. 
An explanation might very simply be viewed as any answer to a 
'why' question that makes the event or phenomenon in question 
somehow appear more intelligible (Boden 1978:32). This is 
usually done by placing the event or phenomenon in question 
in a context within which its occurrence becomes part -of·that 
which is better understood and explained. Given the context, 
the occurrence of the event in question is somehow rendered 
natural and obvious. Arguably the best, and the most widely 
accepted, account of explanation is that of Carl Hempel 
(1965, 1966). The precise details of Hempel's account of 
'scientific' explanation are not important for this 
discussion - we are interested only in a broad 
characterisation - so any rival account will not affect the 
13 
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basic argument. The basic idea behind Hempel's account is 
that explanation ideally takes the form of a deductive 
argument, so that from a statement expressing some particular 
state of affairs or initial conditions and a proposition 
expressing a universal law of nature, the occurrence of the 
phenomenon to be explained can then be deductively derived. 
This is the so-called deductive-nomological or covering law 
model of explanation. For example, let us suppose that we 
are to account for the fact that this particular piece of 
copper expands when heated. 
We have our statement of the initial conditions, viz. this 
metal is heated, and we also have a proposition expressing a 
relevant universal law of nature, viz. all metals expand when 
heated. Then with the addition of a further premise - copper 
is a metal - we can deduce that this piece of copper will 
expand, which is what we set out to explain. 
This would be an example of a causal explanation which 
conforms to the deductive-nomological model, because the heat 
is cited as the cause of the copper's expanding, and citing 
the heat as cause is taken as being explanatory because it is 
backed up or 'guaranteed' by an empirical generalisation, in 
this case a law of nature, to the effect that heat always 
12 
causes metals to expand. 
The deductive-nomological model of explanation is generally 
held up as the ideal of scientific explanation, and there is 
11. For a discussion of the problems in Hempel's account see 
Swinburne 1979:27-30. 
12. This formulation is intended to be neutral with respect to 
any rival theories of causation and explanation which have 
been offered. 
14 
at least one very good reason why this should be so. A 
deductive-nomological explanation of some particular event 
renders that event as uniquely necessary given the antecedent 
conditions and the operation of the universal law, and so it 
provides a compel ling explanation of why that event and no 
other had to occur. It is the determinist's belief, or hope, 
that all events are· capable of being explained by antecedent 
conditions which together with suitable deterministic laws of 
13 
nature logically entail their occurrence. 
Philosophers do, however, recognise a weaker sort of 
explanation, what Hempel refers to'as inductive-statistical 
or probabilistic explanation (1966:58-69), which, because 
it does not rely on a universal law but rather on a 
statistical or probabilistic generalisation, does not 
logically entail the occurrence of the event to be explained 
but nevertheless renders it as likely to occur. The 
likelihood of the event's occurrence will obviously be 
determined by the strength or force of the probabilistic 
generalisation (Hempel 1966:58-59). An example of this 
type of explanation - Hempel's own example - would be our 
explaining Jim's getting the measles by saying that he caught 
the disease from his brother who suffered a bad case of 
infection just a few days earlier. There is no universal law 
connecting exposure to the measles with contracting the 
disease, but there nevertheless is a high probability that 
persons exposed to the measles will in fact contract the 
disease. Given our knowledge of this high probability, and 
13. This is not far off Laplace's classic formulation of the 
thesis of determinism. See van Inwagen 1983:1-22. 
15 
our knowledge that Jim ·was exposed to the disease, we are 
able to infer that there is a high probability that Jim 
caught the disease from his brother, and this constitutes our 
explanation. 
This is of considerable importance for the debate about 
mechanism and agency, as it is for the entire free-will 
issue, because if the most fundamental laws of nature should 
in fact be indeterministic, as current physics suggests they 
indeed are, then this would imply that we can only have 
partial explanations of the phenomena covered by these laws. 
The explanations which rely on these laws would show us why 
the phenomena in question were likely to occur, but could 
never give us certainty as to why they in fact occurred -
because the explanations would be logically consistent with 
the idea that the events concerned were either uncaused or 
caused by something completely different to that which is 
cited in the explanation. This can be made clear as follows: 
a full explanation is one which renders the explanandum event 
as necessary given the antecedent conditions and the 
operation of just those universal laws of nature - it shows 
that given these antecedent conditions and the operation of 
the universal laws, the explanandum event could not fail to 
occur. But what makes this type of explanation possible is 
just that we know of-the requisite universal laws. Should we 
be ignorant of them, either because our science is 
insufficiently advanced or because there just are not any 
such laws to be known (as indeterminists believe is in fact 
the case), thencthe explanandum event is rendered only as 
probable (depending on the probabilistic weight of the 
generalisation) but not necessary. It would be possible for 
16 
the initial conditions and the laws of nature, such as they 
are, to be just as they were before and yet the explanandum 
14 
event can fail to occur. 
The importance of this, I want to argue, lies not in the 
possiblity of their being crucial gaps of randomness in the 
otherwise rigid causal structure of the physical world 
through which an immaterial mind or self can be sneaked into 
the picture, as Eccles (1984) appears to think, but in the 
possibility it leaves open for our ordinary mentalistic 
explanations of human behaviour being the best or strongest 
explanations of these phenomena that we could have. The 
point is that there is a common assumption among most writers 
on this topic that so-called scientific or mechanistic 
explanations of phenomena enjoy a hegemony over our ordinary 
15 
mentalistic explanations. The reason for this is that our 
mentalistic language will never provide us with tight laws of 
human behaviour which could serve as the basis for accurate 
prediction and explanation, whereas a physicalist language 
16 
presumably could. But should we be able to have only partial 
explanations even at the mechanistic or physical level, even 
with a fully developed and mature mechanistic theory of human 
behaviour, then it remains an open question whether the 
mechanistic or intentional explanations will be the best or 
strongest. It might very well be the case that our ordinary 
folk-psychological explanations of human actions render the 
phenomena concerned more strongly than any mechanistic 
explanations do. That is to say that an explanation of. a 
14. For a more detailed account of partial and full 
explanations see Swinburne 1979:25-46. 
15. See for instance Dennett 1973 and Charles Taylor 1964 .. 
16. Davidson (1980B) argues for this view at length. 
17 
piece of human behaviour in terms of the intentions or 
reasons of the agent whose behaviour it is might be a fuller 
and better explanation than any would-be account in terms of 
17 
neuronal firings and nerve impulses. But these ideas will be 
developed more coherently as the discussion progresses. Right 
now I want to say something about the re 1 at ion that may exist 
between two or more explanations of a particular event, and 
this is directly relevant to this entire discussion because 
it is the explanatory incompatibilists' claim that 
mechanistic and intentional explanations of a particular 
piece of behaviour cannot co-exist. And here, as before, the 
aim is to provide only an outline of what seem to be the 
most salient points pertinent to this particular discussion. 
A more detailed discussion would take us too far afield. One 
issue which is not directly addressed is the question of 
reductionism, what exactly it is and when it can be effected. 
There are two reasons for this: (1) much of what will be said 
can be taken as an implicit discussion of the question, and 
(2), as a result of the arguments of philosophers like 
Davidson (1980B,E,F) and Putnam (1974) very few 
philosophers anymore take seriously the idea that our 
mentalistic vocabulary can be reduced to a physicalistic 
vocabulary. For a full treatment of the question of 
reductionism in relation to psychology one can consult any 
number of excellent books and articles dealing with the 
subject, especially Boden 1978 arid Fodor 1968. 
In his Free Will: A Defence against Neurophysiological 
Determinism, John Thorp develops an idea which he calls the 
-17. These issues are discussed in considerable detail 
by Thorp 1980, especially pp.85-93. 
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hegemony which one description or explanation 0£ an event can 
have with respect to any other description or explanation. 
His idea is roughly that the description of an event under 
which that event is most strongly explained or rendered is 
hegemonic with respect to any other description. Let me qoute 
Thorp somewhat at length: 
Explanations differ in strength. The weakest merely 
render an event. Most explanations are of this type: 
they give reasons why an event happened, but those 
reasons would also have been reasons for some other 
event, incompatible with the first, to happen ... 
Explanations of middle strength render an event 
uniquely: they give sufficient conditions for an 
event under that description to occur, rather than 
conditions which are sufficient merely for a 
disjunction of kinds of events. At their best, 
teleologicaal explanations are of this sort. 
The strongest degree of explanation is that which 
renders the explanandum as necessary. The most 
typical case here renders the explanandum as 
naturally or physically necessary ... Finally, the 
description under which an event is most strongly 
rendered by explanation is hegemonic over other 
descriptions under which it is rendered less strongly, 
or under which it is unexplained (1980:90-91.) 
The idea of hegemony can be illustrated by a somewhat 
graphic example. Suppose we explain John's death by citing 
its cause, viz. that he was shot at point-blank range. This 
is a rather weak explanation, because not all shootings at 
point-blank range result in death. But suppose we improve 
the explanation by redescribing the cause as the shattering 
of John's brain by a high-momentum bullet, then it seems that 
we would have provided an explanation which is hegemonic with 
respect to the first because the explanandum event - John's 
death - is rendered more strongly (more probable) at this 
level of description and explanation than the former. We 
might even provide a more hegemonic explanation by appealing 
to information which only neurophysiologists are likely to 
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have at their disposal - an explanation which links up 
certain vital functions of an organism with certain cortical 
processes and structures. The idea, then, of hegemony is 
neither strange or new. It is merely another way of 
describing the' phenomenon of certain regularities and laws 
being themselves explained by yet more fundamental 
regularities and laws, in much the same way as Kepler's laws 
are in turn supported and explained by Newton's laws, ·which 
have a wider and more systematic application (Swinburne 
1979:45; Taylor 1970:50-54). 
None of this should be taken as suggesting that our, usual 
attempts at explanation should always be to provide the most 
hegemonic explanation we can. On the contrary, we often have 
a right to be satisfied with something less, as the example 
above illustrates. Explanations are attempts at illuminating 
the unfamiliar, and they are context-dependent in the sense 
thath the most illuminating explanation of a phenomenon will 
vary according o the interests and aims of those seeking 
enlightenment. The explanatory power of an explanation will 
depend upon its alighting on just those features which are 
pertinent to our particular interests at the time. Putnam 
has a famous example in which he contrasts two different 
explanations of the fact that a square peg a fraction less 
than l" across passes through a square hole 1" across in 
a board which also has a round hole 1'' in diameter, through 
which the peg does not pass. Now we might "by a heroic feat 
of calculation" deduce from a description of the board, holes 
and peg in terms of elementary particles and velocities that 
the peg wi 11 pass through the one region and not the other, 
but the fact that we might be able to deduce this does not by 
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itself guarantee that anything will have been explained. We 
might, far more easily and simply, just say that the board 
and peg are approximately rigid and one of the holes is big 
enough for the peg to pass through and the other not - and in 
this case our explanation would have brought out the salient 
features of the situation which the other explanation did not 
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(Putnam 1974:132). It is in any case not clear which of 
these two explanations is the hegemonic one - one could 
plausibly argue that it is the macro-explanation which 
renders the explanadum events more strongly, because it does 
seem to follow with deductive certainity that the peg will 
pass through the square hole and not the round one once the 
relevant sizes and the rigidity of the objects have been 
taken into account. The general point, however, is that 
reducibility does not quarantee that phenomena will be better 
explained at the micro or lower level than the higher 
"ordinary" level. 
Once it has been admitted that there can be two or more 
descriptions and hence also explanations of a particular 
event, the question arises as to what the relations between 
two such exp 1 anations must be if both are to be accepted as 
valid acounts of the phenomena in question. Swinburne 
(1979:44-47) argues that there can indeed be two distinct 
explanations of an event when either of two conditions 
18. Putnam is making a point about reductionism in this 
example, something which my use of it does not quite bring 
out. His point is roughly that reductionism does 
not entail that phenomema can be better explained in terms 
of lower-level laws and principles than higher ones -
in fact the lower level laws and principles might be 
explanatorily irrelevant as far as the behaviour of 
macro-objects are concerned. 
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are met. The first condition can be met when either of the 
explanations or both are partial explanations of the event in 
question. As an example Swinburne offers the following: 
Thus a man's death from cancer may be explained by 
(l) his smoking and a generalisation about the proportion 
of smokers who die from cancer, and by (2) his parent's 
having died of cancer and a generalisation about those 
whose parents die of cancer who themselves die of 
cancer. Since 1) and 2) only make probable but do not 
necessitate the man's death from cancer, they are only 
partial explanations. Clearly they can be combined 
into a fuller explanation ... (1979:45). 
The second condition Swinburne argues for can be met when the 
two explanations are systematically related in the sense that 
the one can account for the regularities and laws appealed to 
in the other, and this can be true even when both are !1:!ll 
explanations of the event in question. This would be the 
case when there is a relation of reducibilty between the two 
explanations. 
For example, the present position of Mars is explained 
by its position in the last six days and the laws of 
planetary motion formulated more or less correctly 
by Kepler ... Yet the present position· of Mars is also 
explained by its position and velocity last week and 
those of all other heavenly bodies, and Newton's 
laws of motion ... Both are full explanations, 
yet they are clearly compatible. This is because 
Newton's laws and the positions and velocities of 
the planets explain their (approximate) conformity 
to Kepler's laws. Kepler's laws operate because 
Newton's laws operate •.. (1979:45). 
Charles Taylor uses the same example as Swinburne to 
illustrate the second condition, but talks instead of one 
explanation being "more basic" than the other. 
Explanation in the strong sense therefore builds 
in tiers in a way which cannot be understood simply 
as the subsumption of less under more general laws. 
Rather the correlations on one level are explained 
by those on a deeper level in a way which shows their 
relation to other possible outcomes. The first can be 
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seen as a special case of the second: they are shown 
as exemplifications of the deeper correlations under 
some initial conditions. Thus the laws of Kepler are 
the laws of Newtonian mechanics exhibited in the 
relevant initial conditions holding for our solar 
system. We can thus often say of two explanations of a 
given phenomena, that they are compatible but that one 
is more basic than the other, for it appeals to 
deeper level laws which themselves can be used to 
explain the laws involved in the shallower account 
(Taylor 1970:52). 
The second condition mentioned here might be thought too 
strong because it insists on some relation of reducibility or 
derivability between the two explanations, and this is 
contrary to what proponents of the token identity thesis of 
mental and physical states insist on, that even though there 
are no or can be no laws connecting types of mental states 
with types of physical states, each and every state 
nevertheless is identical with some other physical state 
(Davidson 1980B). To accomodate these intuitions one need 
only insist that the two explanations are systematically 
related in at least the sense that the entities and states 
picked out in the one are identical with the entities and 
states picked out in the other even though no re 1 at ion of 
reducibility or derivability between the two respective sets 
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of laws or languages obtains. The important point is that 
there cannot be two unrelated full explanations of an event, 
because a full explanation gives necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the occurence of an event, and there cannot be 
two unrelated sets of necessary and sufficient conditions for 
the occurence of an event. As Swinburne (1979:46) argues: 
For suppose that causes and reasons Fl and also causes 
19. I shall come back to this point in the chapter on 
Physicalisrri. 
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and reasons F2 each fully explain E, and neither in 
any way explains the other. Then Fl is necessary and 
sufficient for the occurence of E. Given Fl, E 
cannot but occur. Now suppose Fl not to have 
occured •.. Then since Fl in no way explains the 
occurence of F2, the non-occurence of Fl would 
in no way affect whether or not F2 occurs. So 
F2 will still occur. Since F2 provides a full 
explanation of E, it is necessary and sufficient 
for the occurrence of E. So E will occur, even though 
Fl does not occur. So Fl cannot be necessary and 
sufficient for the occurence of E, and so the causes and 
reasons involved in Fl cannot fully explain E -
contrary to our original supposition. 
This then completes the discussion of explanation in general. 
The conclusions can be summarised as follows: 
(1) there can only be one hegemonic explanaton of a particular 
phenomenon. 
(2) if there is more than one explanation of some phenomenon, 
then the hegemonic explanation will be the one that renders 
the explanandum event most strongly. 
(3) a full explanation of an event will always be hegemonic 
with respect to any partial explanation of that event. 
(4) there can be two or more disctinct explanations of an 
event, but where this is the case then (a) at least one or 
both must be partial explanations, or (b) they must be 
systematically related in the sense indicated above, viz. 
they must be related as the more to the less basic (in 
Taylor's sense) or there must be a relation of 
referential identity between the entities and states 
picked out in both explanations. 
(5) there cannot be two (or more) unrelated full explanations 
of an event. 
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1.3 Mechanistic and Intentional Explanations 
Enough has been said, I trust, about explanation in general 
and the relations that may exist between two or more 
explanations of the same phenomenon. I now want to redeem my 
undertaking at the beginning of Section 1.2, which is to 
provide a more accurate and specific characterisation of the 
two sorts of explanation which are held by incompatibilists 
to be in conflict,_viz. ·mechanistic and intentional 
explanations of human behaviour. 
Philosophers have, of course, used different rubrics to label 
these two basic types or modes of explanation, but there 
appears to be a rough consensus as to where the distinction 
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falls. Thus what I term mechanistic explanation has been 
variously referred to as "scientific" (Hempel 1966; Swinburne 
1979), or physical, or just simply (and not unambiguously) as 
causal explanation (Peters 1958; Melden 1961). 
These explanations typically account for behaviour by citing 
the causally sufficient physical conditions for the occurence 
of that behaviour, and the terms and concepts which such 
explanations employ would typically come from the so-called 
natural or physical sciences. One would therefore expect 
items such as chemical reactions, neuronal firings and 
muscular contractions to feature in a mechanistic explanation 
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of some particular piece of behaviour. The reason these are 
20. "Mechanistic" is not to be confused with "mechanical", 
viz. explanation in terms of the laws and concepts 
of classical mechanics, using only such notions as force, 
mass, velocity and position. See Boden 1978:32-39. 
21. See Dennett 1973:161. 
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referred to as mechanistic explanations rather than just 
causal explanations is that the notion of"causal 
explanations" is ambiguous: one could hold with Davidson 
(1980A), Goldman (1970) and McGinn (1979) that explanation in 
terms of purpose or intention is a species of ordinary event-
causal explanation, and also insist that explanation in terms 
of purpose and intention differs in a number of important 
respects from our more ordinary notion of causal (i~e. 
mechani.stic) explanation. Alternately, one could hold with 
Richard Taylor (1966) and Roderick Chisholm (1976,1982) that 
the proper an.alysis of action requires a notion of causation 
by an agent which is not reducible to event-causaton. 
Chisholm speaks of immanent (agent) as opposed to transeunt 
(event) causation (1982:28). The point ! wish to make is 
that if this notion of agent-causation should ultimately 
prove acceptable, then one cannot simply talk of causal 
explanation without distinguishing exactly what sense of 
"cause" is intended. Thus one might plausibly maintain that 
explanation by purpose and intention is a variety of causal 
explanation even though it is not event-causation that is 
meant. For this reason, then, the hotion of "causal explana-
tion" is ambiguous and will be replaced, in this discussion, 
by the more circumspect notion of mechanistic explanation 
which marks off clearly what sense of "cause" is intended.· 
A mechanistic explanation, then, is a causal explanation 
where "causal" is to be construed.as referring to efficient 
causation or causation by virtue of some antecedent 
physical event. Two important points - partially referred to 
above - need to be emphasized : 
(1) efficient-causation is always a relation between events 
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(however described) and never between an object and an 
eventor .vice versa. All mechanistic explanations are 
what has been called event-causal in character (Bishop 
1983; Davidson 1980A,B,E,F,H). By this is meant 
that the causal relation which is said to exist between 
two phenomena when one is cited as the cause of the other, 
when it is efficient-causation that is intended, is a 
relation between two events (however described). When we say 
that the stone broke the the window, then this is taken to 
mean that some event involving the stone caused the breaking 
- perhaps its momentum or its velocity, but not just 
the stone all by itself (Swinburne 1979:31). Causality, 
the slogan runs, is a relation between events (however they 
are described). And it is perhaps not inaccurate to say that 
most philosophers today believ·e that efficient-causation is 
the only kind of causality that there is - even Aristotle's 
final causes are said to work, ultimately, by way of 
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efficient causes. 
(2) a mechanistic explanation is always couched in terms of 
relations between physical events. An explanation which 
cites a mental event as a cause would not count as a 
mechanistic explanation even though it could be regarded as a 
causal explanation. This would remain so even though the 
mental event cited is identical with and can be described as 
23 
a physical event. 
A mechanistic explanation will then be any explanation which 
22. For arguments for a more generous interpretation of 
"event-causation" and a comment on Davidson's work in 
this area see Steiner 1986. 
23. See Bennett 1976:48-65 and also pp.72-81. 
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cites an antecedent physical event or state of affairs as the 
cause of the phenomemon to be explained, and such an 
explanation may or may not be supported by or grounded in a 
generalisation which causally links the events thus described 
in a lawful way. If a mechanistic explanation conforms to the 
deductive-nomological model - if it renders the explanandum 
event as uniquely necessary - then it will not only be a full 
explanation but _also a deterministic explanation. 
There are, of course, other types of explanations which are 
not causal explanation in any straightforward understanding 
of the term. There are, for instance,. what John Lucas 
describes as formal explanations, which are the sort of 
explanation we would give when trying to explain why "257 is 
a prime number, orv'i'is irrational, or the monadic predicate 
cilculus is decidable" (1970:48). We shall not be 
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concerned with any of these types of explanation, but shall 
go on straightaway to teleological explanations of which 
intentional explanations are a type. Teleological 
explanations account for behaviour in terms of the end for 
which the behaviour comes about, and they would typically be 
based on a teleological law to the effect that whenever a 
system is in a certain state, it wi 11 behave in whatever way 
is required for it to either maintain that state or achieve 
another (Bennett 1976:39; C. Taylor 1966:3-25). 
The peculiar thing about teleological explanations is that they 
contain an essential reference to a later time in that they 
explain an event in terms of its either 1 eading to or being 
required for a future end or state. It used to be argued 
24. For a full account of these other types of explanation 
see Nagel 1971. 
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that teleological explanations are "unscientific" or in 
some sense only pseudo-explanations because they reverse the 
direction of causality by explaining an event in terms of its 
"effects" rather than an antecedent cause. The work of 
philosophers like Bennett, Nagel, c. Taylor and Larry 
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Wright on teleological explanation has, in my view 
decisively, answered these sorts of objections and shown that 
they are simply based on a misunderstanding. As Bennett 
argues, it is true that a teleological explanation "reaches 
forward in time, not for anything so absurd as a later cause, 
but for a possible later event which is mentioned in the 
description of the earlier cause" (1976:41). 
Intentional explanations are the explanations-which feature 
in our ordinary and everyday account of human (and a lot of 
animal)behaviour. These are the explanations which cite the 
purpose, reasons, beliefs, desires, goals and intentions 
which the agent had in behaving in that way, and they have 
been variously referred to as rational (Lucas 1970; Pears 
1973), purposive (C. Taylor 1964), personal (Swinburne·l979) 
or just as intentional (Dennett 1973; Bishop 1983) 
explanations. Davidson refers to this type of explanation as 
"rationalisation" because the beliefs and desires we 
attribute to an agent are such as to make the behaviour 
appear rational or reasonable in the light of these beliefs 
and desires (1980A:3), and these are the explanations we 
normally give of actions rather than mere bodily movements. 
There are two important features of intentional explanations 
25. Bennett 1976; Nagel 1971; C.Taylor 1964; Larry Wright 
1976. 
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which emerge from their discussion in the literature: 
(1) intentional explanations are teleological in form in that 
they explain by citing the end for the sake of which the 
behaviour comes about (C.Taylor 1964:54). 
(2) they are not merely teleological but also essentially 
ref er to some or other intentional state of the agent 
whose behaviour is being explained. All that is meant by 
this is that the behaviour is explained by reference to some 
or other psychological or mental object, whether this be of 
belief or desire, which the agent had in mind (Boden 1978: 
47-50). This is important because an explanation can 
quite easily be teleological without it being intentional. 
CharlesTaylor distinguishes between teleological explanations 
which are and those which are not genuinely "purposive", 
where what he means by "purposive" is precisely that feature 
of "intensionality" which I referred to above (Taylor 1964: 
54-71). The difference between the two is that a 
purposive or intentional explanation explains by citing 
something about the agent's own view of the situation in 
which he acts rather than merely by citing some goal or end 
which the behaviour as a matter of fact brings or has a 
tendency to bring about. Intentional explanation fixes the 
behaviour as action rather than mere movement which brings 
about a certain end; it implies that the behaviour is 
directed toward a certain goal or end, an end which the agent 
has in mind and plans to achieve by the behaviour. 
Having ventured a brief exposition of what mechanistic and 
intentional explanations basically are, the issue of whether 
they are compatible or not can now be directly addressed. 
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The question is whether there can be both a mechanistic and 
an intentional explanation of a single instance of behaviour. 
Compatibilists claim that there can be; incompatibilists 
claim the opposite. 
Now it might appear that compatibilists have common sense 
quite clearly on their side, for it seems obvious that for 
any ordinary instance of intentional action there is a 
mechanistic story to be told which can go at least some if 
not all the way towards explaining that behaviour. Suppose 
that I raise my arm in order to signal the waiter and that 
this is a full-fledged intentional action. Now my arm's 
going up certainly is a physical event which evidently is 
brought about by antecedent physical events - nerve impulses 
and muscular contractions most probably - and citing these 
would constitute a mechanistic explanation of why my arm went 
up. But the availability of this mechanistic explanation of 
why my arm went up can hardly be thought to be incompatible 
with it nevertheless being true that I raised my arm because 
I wanted to signal the waiter, i.e. with there being an 
intentional explanation of my behaviour. To suppose 
otherwise would be to suppose that I could raise my arm in a 
vacuum as it were, directly, without the usual physiological 
processes such as nerve impulses and musc~lar contractions 
occurring as well, and this we know to be just plainly false. 
So it just cannot be true that an intentional explanation of 
a piece of behaviour excludes there also being a mechanistic 
explanation of the physical events of which that behaviour is 
composed. At least some or other kind of explanatory co-
existence is therefore indicated, and any incompatibilist 
will have to concede as much. 
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But does this sort of compatibility demolish 
the incompatibilist's entire argument? 
I think not. 
All that is required is to point out that the compatibility 
in this instance is but just a case of that general 
condition of compatibilty mentioned in Section 1.2, where 
part of what makes it possible for one set of 1 aws and the 
corresponding explanations to have application is precisely 
that another set of laws and corresponding explanations -
perhaps more basic and wider in scope than the former - also 
have application and partially account for the fact that the 
former laws and explanations hold. .(Remember that Kepler's 
Laws hold because Newton's Laws hold.) In this instance, 
part of what makes it possible for me as an embodied agent 
to raise my arm and hence for there to be an intentional 
explanation of that action is just that the right mechanistic 
laws (of neurophysiology, physiology and biology) also apply 
to me (or at least my body). If they did not, then it just 
would not be possible for me to act in any effective way. As 
Swinburne argues: 
It is for this reason that the motion of a human 
hand is often explicable both by personal and by 
scientific explanations. The motion of my hand 
may be fully explained by goings-on in the nerves 
and muscles of my arm, and by physiological laws. 
It may also be fully explained by my bringing it 
about, having the intention and power so to do. 
Yet in this case the causes and reasons cited in 
each explanation provide a partial explanation of 
the occurrence and operation of the causes and 
reasons cited in the other. The goings-on in my 
nerves and muscles are ... brought about uninten-
tionally by my bringing about the motion of my 
hand intentionally. Also, the operation of 
physiological laws provides part of the explana-
tion of my having the power to move my hand - only 
because nervous discharges are propagated as they 
are, am I able to move my hand (1979:45-46). 
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What the incompatibilist wants to insist on, however, is that 
even though the physical events which comprise an instance of 
action are susceptible to a full mechanistic explanation, it 
cannot be thought that such a mechanistic explanation can be 
extended backwards so as to include among the causes of the 
behaviour physical events occurring 'outside' the agent. 
Put more crudely, if I raise my arm for some or other reason, 
then that physical event cannot be completely explained by 
antecedent physical events stretching back indefinitely to 
physical events occurring 'outside' or 'beyond' me, perhaps 
even to a time before I was born. If it could, then there 
would be a complete mechanistic explanation of the motions of 
my body which would make nonsense of the c 1 aim that I did 
anything or that my intentions and purposings were somehow 
causally relevant to the motions of my body which in fact 
came about. 
Antony Flew (a former compatibilist it might be noted!) puts 
the point this way: 
nothing has been said to preclude the possibility 
- which is surely being ever more abundantly realised 
- of finding physical causes for most of what goes on 
when a moving occurs. The only thing which it is 
contradictory to suggest ... is that there might be 
a complete explanation in terms of physical causes, 
all in their turn fully so caused, of the moving 
itself. Thus, when I move the little finger of 
my right hand there may be - there surely are -
ongoings within the right arm which contingently 
necessitate appropriate contractions in the muscles 
of that finger. But what there certainly cannot 
be, if the moving is truly a moving and not a motion, 
is an unbroken chain of sufficient physical causes 
stretching back indefinitely. It would therefore 
seem that the central nervous system must either be 
or contain an apparatus of which the total input 
does not contingently necessitate every element 
of total output (1978:117). 
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What Flew is arguing here is simply that if an instance of 
behaviour is a genuine instance of action rather than mere 
movement, then there cannot be an explanation of that 
behaviour which totally by-passes the agent whose action it 
is. But in order to secure an explanation which terminates 
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with the agent - in order for the behaviour to be action 
rather than just part of the broader sequence of events -
there cannot be a full mechanistic explanation (i.e. a 
deterministic explanation) of every physical event involved 
in that action where every such event can itself be fully 
explained mechanistically and so on backwards to the point 
where the explanation cites causes 'outside' and independent 
of the agent. Flew's guarded comment about the nervous 
system either being or containing "an apparatus of which the 
total input does not contingently necessitate every element 
of total outpu-e' can simply be taken as a commitment to 
physical indeterminism as a necessary condition for the very 
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possibility of action. 
What the incompatibilist wants to exclude, then, as being 
incompatible with the reality of action, is tha~ type of 
explanation which traces the causes of an action to some 
physical events occurring 'outside' the agent whose action it 
is, where such 'external' causes can fully account for the 
26. Perhaps one need not insist that explanation stop with 
the agent, but only that it somehow include the agent. 
The' agent' might just be an element in a causal chain 
and not a prime-mover unmoved as Chisholm (1982) would 
have it. See Richard Taylor (1966:126-129) for 
arguments to the effect that agent-causation is 
compatible with determinism. The point in any case still 
stands. 
27. Flew has endorsed this interpretation in a personal 
communication. 
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behaviour in question. Let us call this type of explanation 
a complete explanation and say that an event is completely 
explained if it is fully explained by some preceding event, 
or series of events, which has its origin in an object or 
event external to the object undergoing the event being 
explained. 
What is intended here can perhaps best be illustrated by 
a simple example: we have two meters A and B which are 
to register a reading, A being activated by wind-pressure, 
let us imagine, and B by an inbuilt Geiger-counter which 
registers the particle decay of some radio-active substance 
located within it. Assume that modern phy~ics is quite 
correct about the physical indeterminacy of quantum events 
within meter B. Now the reading on meter A can be completely 
explained by. the mechanistic design of the meter and physical 
events occurring outside it which cause it to register just 
what ~t does in a perfectly predictable manner. But the 
reading on meter B cannot be explained in this way.. There 
are no physical events occurring outside the meter which 
cause it to behave as it does, and when we look inside the 
meter for an explanation we come to a point where there just 
are no further physical events to be cited as causes. At 
most we can have a partial explanation in terms of 
probability distributions. The point that requires emphasis 
is that even though the actual fluctuations of the meter-
needle can be·fully explained mechanistically - perhaps in 
terms of electrical input and resistance - the chain of 
causes cannot be traced back indefinitely to some cause 
ouside the system, and it is the physical indeterminism of 
(parts of) the system which secures this fact. 
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In much the same way, the incompatibilist will concede, it 
might we 11 be the case that the motion of my arm, when I 
intentionally raise it, can be fully explained 
mechanistically and also intentionally and hence that the two 
sorts of explanations are to that extent compatible. But· 
what he denies is that such a mechanistic explanation could 
ever be a complete explanation, for it is this, he insists, 
which would be incompatible with the motion of my arm being 
an intentional action. So while it is true, as 
compatibilists claim it is, that there can be both a 
mechanistic and an intentional explanation of a single 
instance of behaviour, it is the incompatibilist's contention 
that this can only be true on the condidtion that the 
mechanistic explanation is not a complete explanation of the 
behaviour in question. 
In Section 1.1 an account was offered of what seem to be the 
prima facie grounds for explanatory incompatibilism, and the 
basic argument developed there suggested that mechanistic 
explanations tend to displace intentional explanations. That 
basic argument can now be modified to the claim that 
mechanistic explanations tend. to displace intentional 
explanations insofar as they are complete explanations of the 
phenomena in question. 
The reasoning behind this argument can now be summarised as 
follows: 
(1) intentional explanations have actions rather than mere 
movements as their proper subjects, and actions either 
include or have among their causal antecedents some or 
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other mental components or volitional state of the agent 
so acting, whether these be his desires, belief.s, willings, 
intendings, goals and reasons or, as agent-causalists argue, 
just the agent himself. 
(2) when behaviour comes about independently of an agent's 
bringing it about or independently of an agent's mental or 
volitional states, then that behaviour can hardly be thought 
of as action at all, but is rather just a sequence of 
movements which have very little if anything to do with the 
agent, other.than possibly being motions of parts of his 
body. 
(3) but if a complete mechanistic explanation of behaviour is 
possible, then that is enough to show that neither an agent 
nor any other of his mental or volitional states were in 
fact causally efficacious in bringing that behaviour about, 
and so by (2) above, the behaviour cannot be thought of as 
action. 
(4) therefore there cannot be both an intentional and a 
complete mechanistic explanation of a single instance of 
intentional action. 
And that, I take it, constitutes the basic argument for 
28 
explanatory incompatibilism. 
Now there are, at least insofar as I can discern, three 
general strategies which a compatibilist might employ in 
trying to avoid the conclusion of the argument above, each 
strategy corresponding roughly to a denial of each of three 
28. Norman Malcolm (1968) offers a· version of this 
argument in his "The Conceivability of Mechanism". 
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premises. Each strategy will be discussed in detail in the 
following three chapters. 
The first strategy - what I refer to as the "D6uble-Language 
Strategy" - amounts to the denial that actions have causes at 
all, the language of action and its explanation being so 
different from that of physical events and their explanation 
that the two can hardly be rivals, as Flew so aptly puts it 
(1978:95), for the occupation of the same area of logical 
space. 
The second strategy, which is discussed under the heading 
"Instrumentalism" consists in denying that intentional 
explanations entail any commitment to regarding the behaviour 
in question as being produced by or involving something 
"mental". Instead it regards the entire "mentalist" language 
of action, agency and intentionality as being merely an 
explanatory device which is ontologically neutral with 
respect to the actual mechanisms underlying behaviour. 
The third strategy, what I refer to as "Physical ism", 
involves the claim that the desires, beliefs, intentions or 
reasons which are said to be the causes of action are 
themselves physical events which can thus feature in a 
mechanistic explanaton of action. Thus a mechanistic 
explanation of behaviour need not be incompatible with an 
intentional explanation of that behaviour because the 
physical states cited as causes are identical with the 
intentional states picked out in the intentional explanation. 
Each of these strategies seem to me to be defective, and in 
the pages that follow I hope to show why. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE DOUBLE-LANGUAGE STRATEGY 
My aim in this chapter is to discuss, and then reject, the 
first of the three strategies a compatibilist might employ in 
tr;y-ing to reconcile mechanistic and intentional explanations 
of behaviour. 
It will be recalled that the first premise of the basic 
argument for explanatory incompatibilism entails a commitment 
to some or other version of the causal theory of action. It 
states that those of our bodily movements which are or 
are part of actions are caused by antecedent mental events 
such as willings, intendings, desires and beliefs and so 
1 
forth, or else just by the agent himself. It is this which 
makes mechanistic and intentional· explanations potential 
rivals, for if it can be shown that a given instance of 
behaviour can be completely explained mechanistically, then 
this would leave no room, so the argument goes, for there 
also being causally efficacious mental antecedents of the 
behaviour - that is unless the two sorts of descriptions and 
explanations are systematically related as the Identity 
2 
Theory claims they are. 
1. The causal theory of action is usually understood as the 
Davidsonian position, i.e. the position which holds that 
those of our bodily movements which are actions are 
caused by the desires and beliefs which rationalise them. 
I use the expression so as to include other causal 
theories such as the "volitionist" theory of Pritchard 
which cl aims that acts of wi 11 are the causes of our 
voluntary and intentional behaviour, as well as the 
agent-causalist theories of Chisholm (1976) and Richard 
Taylor (1966). 
2. See for instance Ryle 1980; Melden 1961; Kenny 1963. 
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So one obvious way of avoiding the alleged conflict is to 
deny that intentional explanations are causal explanations at 
all. And this is indeed what proponents of the double-
3 
language theory do deny. Rather than regarding the reasons 
why an action was performed as ref erring to the mental causes 
of the action, these philosophers argue that the language-
games of offering reasons and citing causes are too different 
to be thought of as rivals for the occupation of the same 
area of logical space. And because they are so different, 
they cannot but be compatible. David Scarrow (1981:13) 
sums up the position quite neatly: 
This was the position that interpreted reasons for 
behaviour as non-causal and the causes of behaviour 
as non-rational. It was a double-aspect theory: 
when behaviour was explained in terms of reasons 
that behaviour was understood as action; when 
behaviour was explained in terms of causes that 
behaviour was explained as physical, bodily 
movement. There could be no question of how a 
physical change could bring about human action, or 
of how a human reason could bring about a physical 
change. Anyone wwho raised this old mind-body 
connundrum was committing a category mistake: he 
was illegitimately homogenising two different 
languages. It is as if one were to ask how it is 
possible to checkmate a king with a piece of ivory. 
The cl as sic statement of the position is to be found in 
Melden's Free Action (1961:184): 
Where we are concerned with causal explanations, 
with events of which the happenings in question 
are effects in accordance with some law of 
causality, to that extent we are not concerned 
with human action at all but, at best, with bodily 
movements or happenings; and where we are concerned 
with explanations of human actions, there causal 
factors and causal laws ... are wholly irrelevant 
to the understanding we seek. The reason is simple, 
namely, the radically different logical characteristics 
of the two bodies of discourse we employ in these 
different cases - the different concepts which are 
applicable to these different orders of inquiry. 
3.See for instance Ryle 1980; Melden 1961; Kenny 1963. 
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The view Melden is expressing here can, of course, be traced 
back ·to Ryle's classic study The Concept of Mind. Like 
Melden, Ryle was concerned to demolish the Cartesian myth of 
the ghost in the machine according to which mental phenomena 
exert pushes and pulls on our bodies - our pineal glands -
thereby raising our bodily motions to the status of free, 
rational and moral actions. Ryle's demolition of the 
Cartesian myth, as well as his alternative picture - logical 
or philosophical behaviourism, is well enough known so as not 
to require rehearsal here. What interests us is how Ryle 
sought to accomodate complete mechanistic explanations for 
our actions with the reality of human,.rational action. In 
his famous chapter on "The Will" in The Concept of Mind Ryle 
addresses the issue directly. Says' Ryle: 
I have spoken of Mechanism as a bogy. The fear that 
theoretically minded persons have felt lest everything 
should turn out to be explicable by mechanical laws is 
a baseless fear. And it is baseless not because the 
contingency which they dread happens not to be 
impending, but because it makes no sense to speak of 
such a contingency. Physicists may one day have found 
the answers to all physical questions, but not all 
questions are physical questions (1980:74). 
The truth of the matter, Ryle goes on to suggest, is that 
mechanistic explanations of behaviour can e_xist alongside 
intentional explanations of behaviour so long as it is 
realised that these are descriptions and explanations at two 
totally different levels, so different that there in fact can 
be no competition_ between them. As an analogy Ryle offers us 
the example of a game of chess. Each piece on the board, he 
says, obeys the laws of physics, but this is not to suggest 
that each piece is thereby constricted to follow a pre-
ordained set of moves which precludes the players playing 
according to the rules of the game and playing intelligently 
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or stupidly. If one wanted to know why a particular piece on 
the board moved from position A to position B, then an 
explanation in terms of the laws of motion and physiology 
might very wel 1 be satisfactory. But if one wanted to know 
why the repositioning of a knight resulted in checkmate for 
the opposing king, then an explanation in terms of the laws of 
physics would be wholly inappropriate. To explain this one 
would need to refer to the rules of the game and the various 
strategies which are permitted within the legal boundaries. 
And this sort of explanation would not be in competition with 
the explanation in terms of the laws of physics. Rather 
they are explanations of different aspects of one and the same 
process, and as Ryle says, "what the illustration is meant to 
bring out is the fact that there is no contradiction in saying 
that one and the same process, such as the move of the 
bishop, is in accordance with two principles of completely 
different types and such that neither is 'reducible' to the 
other, though one of them presupposes the other" (1980:76). 
Applying a 11 this to the case of human action and its 
explanation, the moral of the story ought to be clear: it is 
only if one thinks that human actions are bodily movements 
which have a certain 'mental' causes that one is bound to 
think that there is some tension between mechanistic and 
intentional explanations. For this would mean that the 
physiological causes of our movements must in some way be 
incomplete in order to leave room for the mental causes. But 
the mistake here is to suppose that it is the business of 
action-explanations to provide causes of the actions, and 
this, Ryle argues, is to misunderstand the logic of the 
language of action. Described as physical movements, our 
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behaviour consists in a complex series of physiological 
occurrences the explanation of which would consist in citing 
the relevant physiological causes and laws. But described 
as actions, our behaviour consists in a complex set of 
interactions which can only be explained by placing them in 
the context of the rules, conventions and institutions of the 
society in which they occur, and this is not a matter of 
finding causes - mental or physical - at all. 
Two questions naturally suggest themselves at this point. 
Firstly, why is it supposed that the explanation of the 
action in terms of reasons is not to be understood as causal 
explanation, and secondly, if citing reasons is not causal 
explanation, then what is it? 
In reply to the first question, proponents of the double-
language theory normally bring two sorts of considerations to 
bear - the so-called Logical Connection Argument in order to 
show that reasons cannot be causes, and then the 
Contextualist theory of action in order to show that there 
cannot be causal laws which can state necessary and sufficient 
conditions for human actions. 
Firstly the Logical Connect~on Argument. Appeal is popularly 
made to Hume's requirement that causes be logically distinct 
from their effects, but since.all the likely candidates for 
causes of actions - motives, desires, intentions, beliefs, 
etc. - are all logically connected with the actions of which 
they are meant to be the causes, they cannot be distinct in 
the required way. Therefore reasons cannot be causes. This 
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argument appears in various guises in Ryle, Melden, Kenny, 
. 4 
Whiteley and Richard Taylor. 
Melden, for example, writes as follows: 
Let the interior events which we call "the act of 
volition" be mental or physical (which it is makes no 
difference at all), it must be logically distinct from 
the alleged effect - this surely is one lesson we can 
derive from a reading of Hume's discussion of causation. 
Yet nothing can be an act of volition that is not 
logically connected with that which is willed - the act 
of willing is intelligible only as the act of willing 
whatever it is that is willed (1961:53). 
Later on, when discussing the relatiori between "wanting" and 
"desiring" and action, Melden says: 
If the relation were causal, the wanting to do would be, 
indeed it must be, describable independently of any 
reference to the doing. But it is logically essential 
to the wanting that it is the wanting to do something of 
the required sort with the thing one has. Hence the 
relation between the wanting to do and the· do.ing cannot 
be a causal one (1961:128). 
The same sorts of considerations can be aplied to all the 
candidates for causes of our actions, and in each case the 
conclusion would be the same: all these items are 
conceptually re 1 a ted to the doings of which they are meant to 
be the causes, and since the relation is conceptual it cannot 
be causal, for causes must be logically distinct from their 
effects. Thus when I raise my arm because I want to signal 
the waiter, the 'because' here is not to be understood as 
implying that my wanting to signal the waiter is a distinct 
event which stands in the relation of cause to the arm's 
4. Ryle 1980:87-88; Melden 1961:52-55, 83-89, 115, 191; 
Kenny 1963:80; Whiteley 1968:106-108; R. Taylor 1966: 
222-223. 
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going up, for if this were the case, then there must be some 
way of referring to and describing the 'wanting' independently 
of the action of which it is meant to be the cause. But this 
surely cannot be done, for to say that I want to signal the 
waiter is just to say that I am disposed to act in such a way 
as is appropriate to bring about the desired result, and in 
this context - the restaurant say - raising one's arm just 
5 
is the action of signalling the waiter. There are not two 
actions, that of raising my arm and also the action of 
signalling the waiter, but only the one action which is 
dessribable both as raising my arm and as signalling the 
6 
waiter. So to say that I want to signal the.waiter is just 
to say that I was disposed to raise my arm because in this 
context raising my arm is the very same action as signalling 
the waiter. But in that case the 'wanting' is conceptually 
connected with the doing, and so cannot be a cause of the 
doing. So far from citing some cause of my arm going up by 
saying that I did it because I wanted to signal the waiter, 
as though my wanting to signal the waiter is a distinct event 
which can be discovered independently of any doing, the 
action of raising my arm is explained by describing further 
what sort of an action it was, what its context was, what the 
pattern is into which it fits given the rules, conventions 
and institutions of the society in which it occurs. 
A related consideration which double-language theorists bring 
to bear in order to show that the explanation of action does 
not involve the citing of mental or physiological causes nor 
5. Melden:l52-153, 169. 
6. Anscombe 1979:11; Davidson 1980A:l4, 1980C:56-61. 
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the application of causal laws, is that which draws its 
inspiration from the so-called contextualist theory of 
7 
action. This is the view that actions are constituted as the 
actions they are not by any specifiable physical or 
physiological features, but rather by the norms, conventions 
8 
and social institutiorts of the society in which they occur. 
The reason for this is that an indefinite number of different 
physical movements can all satisify the description of being 
the performance of one and the same action type, and a number 
of identical bodily movements can all count as totally 
different action types depending on the context within which 
they occured. Thus the action type of making a payment can 
be realised in a variety of action tokens, from signing a 
cheque to handing over coins, and the act of raising an arm 
may count as the action type of signalling the waiter in one 
situation and also as the action type of delivering as insult 
in another situation or society. 
P.F. Strawson has argued that "if every case of someone's 
tel ling a lie were an instance of one physically specifiable 
class of sets of physical movements (and vice versa), and 
every case of someone's jilting his girlfriend were another 
such case (and vice versa), then the reign of law in physical 
movements would mean that lying and jilting could be 
deterministically explained. There would, as far as lying 
and jilting were concerned, be physical laws of human action 
as well as physical laws of physical movement. But there is 
7. Melden 1961:179-198; R.S. Peters 1958:12-15; 
Anthony Kenny 1973:93-97. 
8. For a fuller account of the view see Shaffer 1968:94. 
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no question of such correlations ever being established". 
The upshot of all this is meant to be that since from a 
physiological description only we could never infer exactly 
which action has been performed, an explanation of 
behaviour in terms of physiological causes and laws would 
never amount to the explanation of the action. Or as Melden 
(1961:200) says: "absolutely nothing about any matter of 
human conduct follows logically from any account of the 
physiological conditions of bodily movements". 
Human actions, then, are explained not by citing causes and 
causal laws, but by the complex business of relating them to 
the beliefs, desires, goals and intentions of the agents who 
perform them in the contexts in which they are performed. 
And this, the double-language theory maintains, is a business 
of exhibiting the logical - not causal - relations which may 
or may not hold between these various items/factors. It is 
this which makes them susceptible, unlike mere physiological 
happenings, to rational and moral appraisal. Described as 
bodily movements, hum~n behaviour is a series of 
physiological occurences "for which physiological occurences 
10 
would appear to be sufficient causal.conditions"; described 
as actions which agents perform, the behaviour can only be 
explained by reference to the rules, conventions and 
institutions of the community within which they occur. So 
far from mechanistic and intentional explanations being 
rivals, they are too far apart and too different to be in 
9. Pears 1963:66. 
10. Melden 1961:200. 
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competition. It is only the illegitimate application of the 
causal model to human action and its explanation which can 
make them appear to be rivals. But once this "fatal blunder11 
has been spotted and eradicated, it should be obvious that 
there is no question of incompatibility between these two 
sorts of explanations. Once it has been appreciated that the 
explanation of human action constitutes an autonomous 
language-game within which the rules and logic of the game do 
not permit the language of cause and effect - as these 
concepts are employed in the physical sciences - then it can 
be seen how both sorts of language-game, that of action and 
that of bodily movement, can both have their proper 
application and place without in any way encroaching upon one 
another. 
The question, then, of whether a complete mechanistic 
explanation of human behaviour is possible becomes irrelevent 
to its characterisation and explanation as human action which 
can be rationally or morally appraised. As Kenny says": 
Even one hundred per cent predictability at the 
level of physiology need not by itself involve any 
increase in predictability at the human level. 
For physiological -laws will enable us to predict 
physiological effects from physiological causes: 
and we shall need in addition at least tranlation-rules 
from the language of physiology into the language 
of human behaviour (1973:94). 12 
And this possibility, the argument concludes, cannot be 
realised. 
So even unlimited success in the physical explanation of 
human behaviour would leave unimpaired the fact that the 
11. Melden 1961:202. 
12. See also Melden 1961:214-215. 
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11 
physical motions thus explained can also be viewed and 
appraised as the intelligent or stupid, moral or vicious, 
intentional actions of free and rational human agents. 
Having been exposed to a view like this, one might be 
forgiven for simply sighing despairingly and saying "If only 
it were that easy". For the first problem with this double-
language theory, indeed the central problem, is that it just 
seems to conflict head-on with one of our most cherished 
intuitions, namely that our reasons, desires,intentions and 
goals, in short our mental lives, do make a difference to 
what in fact happens in the physical world. And it is hard to 
see what sort of a difference this could possibly be if 
it is not a causal difference. By keeping reasons 
and causes so far apart, as this view does, our mental 
lives begin to look more like shadowy epiphenomena than 
the causally efficacious realities we intuitively take 
them to be. As Scarrow (1981:13) argues: 
An arsonist's desire to see a building in flames and 
his beliefs about how to accomplish this end can bring 
about physical destruction. If his desires and beliefs 
had been different the building he destroyed would 
still be standing. And a counterfactual of this 
sort signifies causality: it signifies that the 
reasons and beliefs played a causal role in bringing 
about a physical eventuality. Socrates' claim that his 
physical presence in prison must be explained in terms 
of his moral convictions rather than in terms which 
altogether omit his beliefs, principles, and decisions 
still stands as a challenge to any version of the 
double-aspect theory. 
According to the double-language theory, when we say that 
John raised his arm because he wanted to signal the waiter, 
the 'because' here is to be understood entirely non-causally. 
It is rather to be understood as generating further 
descriptions of the action, descriptions which relate 
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action to the desires, beliefs and goals of the agent in the 
light of which the behaviour can be seen as fitting into a 
rational pattern. The explanation of action, on this view, 
is more like justification than the normal sort of causal 
explanation encountered in the physical sciences. Davidson 
(1980A:10) admits that actions are explained in this way: 
"when we explain an action, by giving the reason, we do 
redescribe the action; redescribing the action gives the 
action a pl ace in a pattern and in this way the action is 
explained". But Davidson denies "that, because pl acing the 
action in a larger context explains it, therefore we now 
understand the sort of explanation involved. Talk of 
patterns and contexts does not answer the question of how 
reasons explain actions, since the relevant pattern or 
context contains both reason and action"(1980A:ll). 
Davidson has also pointed out that even though intentional 
explanations do involve an element of justification which the 
more usual causal explanations do not, one cannot infer from 
this that explanation. by reasons cannot also be causal 
explanation with the feature of justification being just one 
distinguishing mark (1980A:9). The problem, Davidson 
points out, is that there is a difference between providing a 
reason as justification for what one did and providing the 
reason ori which one acted - "a person can have a reason for 
an action, and perform the action, and yet this reason not be 
the reason why he did it. Central to the relation between a 
reason and an action it explains is the idea that the agent 
performed the action because he had the reason"( 1980A:9 ). 
But how is the double-language theorist who denies that 
reasons are or can be causes to endorse the force of this 
'because'? 
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How is he to endorse the difference between this 'because' 
and the because of mere justification unless it is by 
recognising that in theone way case the reasons are 
13 
causally operative and in theother not? 
I have already mentioned that double-language theorists 
appeal to the logical connections between reasons and actions 
in order to deny that reasons are or can be causes. The 
fallacy in this move, however, has been conclusively 
demonstrated by Davidson, especially in his "Actions, Reasons 
and Causes" (1980A) which set out to reaffirm the Socratic 
position that reasons make a causal difference to the way the 
world is. The basic mistake, Davidson argues, is to think 
that events themselves rather than the descriptions of the 
events can be logically related. If this were true, then it 
would be impossible for the cause of B to cause B, because 
the description of the one event contains a reference to the 
other. But the logical relation here is purely grammatical -
it depends on ho:!! the events are described rather than on 
what events are described. Once this has been appreciated, 
it can easily be seen that 'the cause of B' is but one 
description of the event picked out by another of its 
descriptions, viz. 'A', and so even though there may be 
descriptions of the events which logically relate them, the 
events themselves are not logically related and hence there is 
no obstacle to thembeing related as cause to effect. 
13. Davidson's remark that "if, as Melden claims, causal 
explanations are "wholly irrelevant to the understanding 
we seek' of human action, then we are without an 
analysis of the 'because' in 'He did it because ... ', 
where we go on to name a reason" (1980A:ll) is surely 
pertinent here. 
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Thus even though it might very well be true that we cannot 
refer to or describe a reason apart from the action it 
explains, this would be no obstacle to the reason and action 
being causally related. Causal relations, so the slogan 
runs, are extensional, they hold between events however they 
14 
are described. So if reasons are not to be regarded as 
causes, then it will have to be for some reason other than 
their conceptual connection with the actions they explain. 
The next criticism concerns Melden's claim that explanations 
of bodily movements and explanations of actions are so far 
apart that "absolutely nothing about any matter of human 
conduct follows logically from any account of the 
physiological conditions of bodily movement" (1961:200). This 
surely is an exaggeration. G. Warnock has pointed out that 
while it may be true that from a purely physiological account 
of some happening we may never be able to infer which action 
had been performed, it might nevertheless be possible to infer 
15 
that some particular actions had not been performed. As 
Antony Flew comments: "It is not hard, for example, to think 
upphysiological descriptions from which we could infer that 
the person so described had not sat down in a chair, bowled 
an over overarm, or committed adultery"(1979:113). 
What is probably true about Melden's claim is that there 
could not be physiological conditions both necessary and 
sufficient for the performance of some action ~, 
such as de 1 i vering an insult The reason for this is 
that ·the action type can be realised in an indefinite 
14. Davidson 1980F:243. 
15. Pears 1963:77. 
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number of physical ways, or, as R. S. Peters has put it, "we 
can never specify an action exhaustively in terms of 
16 
movements of the body or within the body". But what one is 
not entitled to infer from this is that there are no 
physiological conditions both necessary and sufficient for 
the performance of each and every particular action token, 
for what is true of action types need not be true of action 
tokens. The point is that while there may never be physical 
laws of human actions as such - no physical laws specifying 
what would count as the delivery of an insult for example -
one cannot conclude from this that the delivery of an insult 
on a particular occasion cannot be accounted for in terms of 
physical causes and laws. C.H. Whiteley (1973:65) puts it 
this way: 
The concept "disaster" can occur in no physical law; 
for what makes a happening a disaster is its relation 
to human desires and values, with which physics 
is not concerned. But this does not prevent such a 
disaster as the Lisbon earthquake from being 
completely accounted for as the effect of physical 
·causes operating according to physical laws ... Nor, 
from the fact that human actions as such cannot be 
causally accounted for in physical terms, are we 
entitled to conclude that they cannot be causally 
accounted for at all. The argument assumes, and 
does not show, that all causes are physical and that 
explanations in terms of the apprehension of reasons 
are not causal. 
Davidson (1980A:13) raises a slightly different but 
related objection: 
Melden asks the causal theorist to find an event 
that is common and peculiar to all cases where a man 
intentionally raises his arm, and this, it must be 
admitted, cannot be produced. But then neither can 
a common and unique cause of bridge failures, plane 
crashes, or plate breakings be produced. 
The problem with the double-language view, as Flew for 
16. R.S.Peters 1958:12. 
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17 
has pointed out, is that if both the language-game of 
explaining bodily movements and the language-game of 
explaining actions are to have application to this one 
world, then we should expect that the two languages would 
18 
intersect each other at some or other point. And so we know 
that they do. For human actions often are or include items 
of bodily movements. When I raise my arm in order to signal 
the waiter, to use this now well-worn example, then it 
fol lows that my arm goes up. But this familiar sort of 
bodily movement needs to be distinguished from the case where 
though it is true that my arm goes up, I do not raise it - it 
happens to me, a reflex motion, say, of some or other sort. 
But how, according to the double-language theory, is this 
19 . 
distinction supposed to be made? For it has to be admitted 
that the genuine qase of the raising of an arm is no more and 
no 1 ess a bodi 1 y movement than the mere rising of an arm, but 
if the one is an action and the other not then the difference 
between the two, even (or especia 11 y one cou 1 d say) at the 
physiological level, must surely lie in the way in which 
these two items of bodily movements are generated, i.e. in 
their causal or~gins. And in that case we are led back to 
some sort of causal theory of action - we are led back to 
saying that some items of bodily movement are actions in 
virtue of having certain characteristic causal antecedents 
which mere bodily movements do not have. 
17. Flew 1975:114. But see also Richman 1969:48; J.R. 
Lucas 1970:20. 
18. Kant's solution to this problem was to deny that we in 
fact have only one world. See Boyle 1976:100-121. 
19. Some writers on the topic of action think that this is 
the central problem of the entire philosophy of 
action. See Frankfurt 1978:157. 
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The double-language theorist, it seems, in order to be 
consistent, would have to say that we distinguish between 
those bodily movements which are or are part of actions and 
those which are mere happenings in some way other than 
appealing to causes. But what could this other way be? 
Melden says that it is through "training" that we learn to 
see other people's behaviour as action, as behaviour which is 
to be understood in terms of the distinctively human concepts 
20 
of action, reason, m·oti ve and purpose. He says: 
But how is it possible for us to see a person raise 
his arm, to see a bodily movement as an action? 
Wel 1, how is it possible for us to read a printed page, 
to see, not curiously shaped black marks on a white 
background, but the sentences that lie before us? 
Here the answer is simply 'Training'. 
Malden, no double, has a point here. But the analogy he 
suggests is surely misconceived. For none of us have ever 
thought or believed that a printed page in itself signifies 
anything. None of us have ever thought that the squiggles on 
the page signify anything independentl~ of what, by 
the conventions we have, we take them to signify. But the 
case with action is different. Fo.r here there does seem to 
be ~o~e fact of the matter about what a person is doing which 
is independent of how it is perceived or regarded by others. 
When a person is raising his arm, then irrespective of how 
this is seen by others, whether as a sign a 11 ing or as an 
insult or whatever, there surely is one description of what he 
is doing which has a status untouched by all other perceptions 
and descriptions, and that is the agent's own description of 
20. Malden 1961:187. 
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what he is doing. My point is that whether something is an 
action or not depends on what the agent is doing and not just 
on how the bodily motions are seen by others. And this is 
unlike the printed page which depends for being a piece of 
meaningful writing precisely on being understood as such in 
21 
virtue of the conventions of a particular society. In itself 
it is merely a collection of squiggles. 
The same point can be pursued somewhat differently. If we 
ask ourselves the question "Why should we regard a piece of 
bodily movement as an action?", then, if the double-language 
theory were true, there would be no plausible answer. For if 
there is nothing 'internal' to the behaviour which makes it an 
action, if it were entirely a question of choosing to 
describe and explain it as such, then we could conceivably 
describe any piece of behaviour as action regardless of 
whether there are intentions, reasons or goals present at 
22 
all, and this seems decidedly odd. For we can readily 
imagine a new breed of sophisticated robots which resemble 
genuine human persons in all respects except that they have 
no mentality whatsoever. Are we to 'see' their behaviour as 
action also? Are we to suppose that they are capable of 
action just because their behaviour can be explained and 
understood within the language-game of human action and its 
explanation? If this were the case, then the distinction 
between action and mere bodily movement, of which Melden 
21. Charles Taylor (1985B:l93) makes a roughly similar 
point in the connection with the problem of attributing 
actions to machines. 
22. This is, of course, the instrumentalist approach to the 
question favoured by Dennett which will be discussed 
in the next chapter. 
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makes much, would appear to become obscure indeed, for then 
there would be no reason - apart, perhaps, from a reduced 
23 
capacity to successfully predict and explain - not to 
ascribe reasons· and intentions to even the simplest of 
mechanisms and explain their behaviour according to the 
pattern of human action. The conclusion ought to be that if 
there is a difference between actions and mere bodily 
movements, then the difference cannot consist simply in the 
way we happen to explain these two sorts of occurences, but 
must consist insomething ·internal' to the occurences 
themselves, and itis hard, perhaps impossible, to see what 
this could be if notsome difference in the causal antecedents 
- described mentally or physically - of the two sorts of bodily 
movements. 
Ryle, it will be remembered, attempted to show that 
-"Mechanism" is a "mere bogy", that "not only is there 
plenty of room for purpose where everything is governed by 
mechanical laws, but there would be no place for purpose if 
things were not so governed" (1980:70). He says: 
The favourite model to which the fancied mechanistic 
world is assimilated is that of billiard balls 
imparting their motion to one another by impact. 
Yet a game of billiards provides one of the simplest 
examples of a course of events for the description of 
which mechanical terms are necessary without being 
sufficient . Certainly, from accurate knowledge of the 
weight, shape, elasticity and movements of the 
balls, the constitution of the table and the 
.. 
23. This connects with our view that we believe in other 
minds, not by virtue of some inference from our own case 
(the argument from analogy), but because it is the best 
explanatory hypothesis we have at this stage. See 
Churchland 1986:67-72 as well as Dennett 1973:164. 
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conditions of the atmosphere, it is in principle 
possible, in accordance with known laws, to deduce 
from a momentary state of the balls what will be 
their later state. But it does not fol low from this 
that the course of the game is predictable in 
accordance with those laws alone. A scientific 
forecaster, who was ignorant of the rules and 
tactics of the game and of the skill and plans 
of the players, could predict, perhaps, from the 
beginning of a single stroke, the positions in which 
the balls will come to rest before the next stoke 
is made; but he could predict no further. The 
player himself may be able to foresee with modest 
probability the sort of break that he will make, for 
he knows, perhaps,. th~ best tactics to apply to 
situations like this and he knows a good deal about 
his own skill, endurance, patience, keenness and 
intentions. 
But this seems entirely odd. For if everything in the 
universe, including every item of human bodily movement, is 
governed by mechanistic laws according to which it is in 
principle possible to make accurate predictions, then how is 
it possible to deny that the course of the game of billiards 
can also be so predicted? For here, as everywhere, every 
move of every muscle, every stroke of every cue, every 
movement of every ball is subject to these mechanistic laws, 
and the course of events on, in and around the billiard table 
is but the inevitable consequence of physical causes 
operating according to these laws. It is interesting to note, 
as Skillen (1984:517) points out, that "Ryle's discussion 
of the physics of billiards ends with the cue, at the other 
end of which is more or less 'skill, endurance. patience, 
keenness and intentions' .... So despite what he says 
elsewhere Ryle denies .... the Principle of Physical 
Determinism, since he denies that the physical location of a 
ball is in principle predictable in the light of physical 
knowledge". 
The trouble is, of course, to make the "skill, endurance, 
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patience, keenness and intentions" relevant to what goes on 
on the table. If they are not relevant, then we do not have 
much of a game, at least not in any ordinary understanding of 
the term. We might as wel 1 regard the motion of the planets 
as a game. But if they are relevant, then the only way they 
can get purchase on what goes on on the table is by being 
causally operative factors, in which case we are led back, 
once again to some or other version of the causal theory of 
action. 
In conclusion then, I submit, the view has to be rejected that 
mechanistic and intentional explanations can be made 
compatible by banningcausality altogether from the arena 
of human action. Apart from the weakness df the arguments 
for this move, the view ends up obscuring the distinction 
between actions and mere events which it was its prime purpose 
to bolster. The difficulty is, I have argued, is that the 
language-game of action and the language-game of mere events 
do overlap - actions often are or at least include items of 
bodily movements, and since these presumably can in prnciple 
be completely explained mechanistically, it becomes difficult 
to see why they, or some of them at least, should be 
24 
regarded as actions at all. It was admitted, of course, 
24. Identity theorists who subscribe to the causal theory of 
action at least have an answer to this: actions just are 
those of our bodily movements brought about by our 
reasons and intentions, etc., and these are the very same 
events as those picked out in the mechanistic explanation 
of our behaviour. 
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that we could - and probably would - continue to regard these 
mechanistic occurences as actions and hence choose to explain 
them as such, but this, I submitted, is contrary to what 
double-language theorists in any case set out to show. For 
it was hoped that by showing that the notion of causality is 
inapplicable to human actions, then, as Richman puts it, "we 
would have rescued human freedom (conceptually) at just the 
point - that of human action - which is essential for 
26 
morality". But far from showing that our status as free and 
rational agents has nothing to fear from mechanism, the 
position that emerges is that our intentions and desires are 
irrevelant to the motions of our bodies which in fact come 
about. Our freedom and agency, on this view, becomes little 
more than linguistic - it exists only insofar as we choose to 
explain our behaviour in the language-game of action rather 
than mere movement. We are free and rational, it would seem, 
to the same extent that a plant is when, under~oing the 
process of photo-tropism, we explain its behaviour not by 
reference to biological causes and laws, but by reference to 
its desire to acquire more sunlight and its belief that by 
moving a branch upwards to the left it wi 11 achieve this end. 
But this, I think, is no freedom or agency at all. An 
incompatibilist can still insist that since the behaviour in 
question can be completely explained mechanistically, there 
is no reason to regard it as action in the first place. One 
25. P.F.Strawson has argued that not only will it be 
irrational for us to do so, but also that we probably 
never could abandon our ordinary, intentional outlook 
on human behaviour. See Strawson 1980:1-25. 
26. Richman 1969:42. 
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condition, at the very least, for something being an agent or 
for its behaviour being action, surely, must be that its 
behaviour is somehow produced or caused by its desires, 




3.1 Intentional Explanations as an Explanatory Device 
In the previous chapter I considered and then rejected the 
view that mechanistic and intentional explanations could be 
reconciled by keeping them in totally different categories, 
bodily movements occurring in the realm of causality but 
actions not. The fact is that these two language-games do 
overlap, and any plausible account of their relation will 
have to accomodate this f act.r Our actions for the most part 
are or at least include physical movements, and if 
these occur within the ordinary realm of causality, then 
1 
presumably so do our actions, or at least parts of them. 
The problem, for the compatibilist, is to account for this 
fact. What he has to account for is the possibility that all 
our bodily movements can be completely explained 
mechanistically and at the same time also be the intentional 
actions of rational agents. 
There are, at least insofar as I can discern, only two 
alternatives: either our intentions, desires, reasons and 
beliefs etc. are themselves physical events which can thus 
feature in a complete mechanistic account of our behaviour, 
as proponents of the Identity Theory claim. Or else there 
just are no such things as actions, agents, desires, reasons 
1. "Melden, for example, says that actions are often 
identical with bodily movements, and that bodily 
movements have causes; yet he denies that the causes 
are causes of the actions. This is, I think, a contra-
diction." (Davidson 1980A:l8).See also Melden 1961:74. 
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and beliefs which require to be accomodated within a complete 
mechanistic account of human behaviour, as eliminative 
materialists claim. Instead, these concepts are to be 
regarded as an explanatory device in the absence of a 
complete mechanistic understanding of behaviour. My aim in 
2 
this chapter is to discuss this latter alternative. 
Explanatory incompatibil ism, to recall, can simply be 
formulated as the thesis that where and whenever a complete 
mechanistic account of a piece of behaviour is available, 
then that behaviour cannot be the intentional action of a 
rational agent. 
Stated like this however, the view lends itself to a type of 
objection, what I have called the Instrumentalist objection, 
3 
which is advanced by, among others, Daniel Dennett. 
The objection, very briefly, is this: whether a piece of 
behaviour is to count as an instance of intentional action is 
not an ontological issue concerning the 'mechanisms' whereby 
the behaviour in fact comes about, but is rather a question 
of whether it makes good predictive and explanatory sense to 
view the behaviour from within an intentional framework. The 
mistake of the incompatibilists, according to this view, is 
their failure to see that our usage of intentional 
2. This is not intended to be a discussion of eliminative 
materialism as such, but only a discussion of how it is 
thought that this strategy can reconcile mechanistic and 
intentional explanations of behaviour. The discussion 
focuses exclusively on the writings of one exponent, 
namely Daniel Dennett, in the hope that the views 
expressed will be fairly representative. 
3. For a similar point of view and related arguments see 
Rorty 1965; P. Churchland 1986 and P.S. Churchland 1986. 
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explanations is ontologically neutral with respect to the way 
in which behaviour is in fact 'produced' within a particular 
system. Since the intentional explanation of a piece of 
behaviour leaves it entirely open as to the actual mechanisms 
by which the behaviour comes about (and this is in any case a 
matter for science to settle), any underlying mechanistic 
4 
account of the behaviour, if there is one at all, cannot be 
ruled out or be incompatible with the intentional account. 
The sort of argument put forward here is strongly reminiscent 
of those arguments for modal compatibilism which purport to 
show that the only coherent sense to the notion of freewill 
is that which is ontologically neutral with respect to either 
determinism or indeterminism. The argument here is usually 
that the criteria whereby we pick out paradigmatic cases of 
free action are entirely mute as regards the actual causal 
histories of the actions involved, but concern rather the 
question whether the agent could or could not have done 
5 
otherwise under the circumstances. This view is generally 
supported by appeal to the now famous 'conditional' analysi~ 
of the 'could' of the previous sentence, whereby to say that 
an agent could have done otherwise is just to say that he 
would have done otherwise had he so chosen or wanted. And 
this concept of free action is compatible with determinism. 
4. In his The Explanation ofBehaviour Charles Taylor seemed 
to argue that the intentional explanation of behaviour 
ruled out there being an underlying mechanistic account. 
But in Taylor 1970 and Taylor 1985A he rejects all a 
priori arguments like that of Norman Malcolm's (1968) to 
establish the point and settles for the moderate position 
of regarding this as an empirical issue to be settled by 
us finding an account of human behaviour which is more 
basic than the intentional account. 
5. See for example Smart 1963:122-126. For a modern and 
sophisticated version of this argument see Dennett 1984. 
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In much the same way, the argument goes, we pick out 
paradigmatic intentional actions not by examining whether the 
behaviour comes about mechanistically or not, but rather by 
seeing whether it makes sense to speak of reasons for action 
in the context. If it does, then the behaviour can plausibly 
be viewed as intentional action, irrespective of whether 
there in fact is an underlying mechanistic structure to the 
behaviour or not. 
Dennett develops his concept of an intentional system with its 
attendant intentional stance with the explicit aim of 
forming, as he says, "a bridge connecting the intentional 
domaim .•. to the non-intentional domain of the physical 
sciences"(l979:22). An intentional system, says Dennett, 
is a system whose behaviour can be successfully "predicted 
and explained by relying on ascriptions to the system of 
beliefs and desires (and hopes, fears, intentions, hunches, 
... )"(1979:3). In viewing a system as an intentional system 
one adopts what Dennett calls the intentional s't:ance toward 
that system, and the hallmark of the intentional stance is 
the presupposition it makes regarding the rationality of the 
system in question. One assumes that the system is rational, 
and it is only after discovering lapses in or limits to its 
6 
rationality that one adopts the mechanistic stance toward it. 
Now there certainly are numerous instances of behaviour where 
we adopt the intentional stance toward a system even though 
we know of perfectly good mechanistic explanations of that 
6. Dennett 1973:164. Dennett distinguishes two mechanistic 
stances: the design stance and the physical stance. 
The difference between them need not concern us here and I 
will use 'mechanistic stance' to refer only to the latter. 
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behaviour, however cumbersome or superfluous these in fact 
may be (Dennett 1973:164). Such is the case when we adopt 
the .intentional stance toward a chess-playing computer. We 
assume that the computer will make rational moves given its 
assessment of the situation, and it is only when we detect 
limitations in its design or breakdowns in its function that 
we adopt the mechanistic stance, as when we call in the IBM 
repair-man to reconnect some circuits. Similarly with guided 
missiles. We adopt the intentional stance toward them when 
we talk of their goals, their pursuit of and homing in on the 
target, etc. We assume that the system will make rational 
responses and adjustments according to its perception of the 
situation, and it is only when we suspect a malfunction in 
its mechanical working out of rational responses that we 
adopt one of the mechanistic stances. 
In adopting the intentional stance toward a system one does 
not make any assumptions as to whether the system real~ is 
conscious, or reall:_y has beliefs, desires or intentions. One 
merely ascribes these intentional states to a system as an 
explanatory device without regard for any ontological 
commitments they may imply. Dennett (1979:7) says: 
Lingering doubts about whether the chess-playing 
computer really has beliefs and desires are 
misplaced; for the definition of intentional 
systems I have given does not say that intentional 
systems really have beliefs and desires, but 
that one can explain and predict their behaviour by 
ascribing beleifs and desires t~ them, and whether 
one calls what one ascribes to the computer beliefs 
or belief-analogues or information complexes or 
intentional whatnots makes no difference to the 
nature of the calculation one makes on the basis 
of the ascriptions. 
And elsewhere (1973:164) he says: 
The success of the [intentional] stance is of course 
a matter settled pragmatically, without reference to 
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whether the object really has beliefs, desires, 
intentions and so forth, so whether or not any 
computer can be conscious, or have thoughts or 
desires, some computers undeniably are intentional 
systems, for they are systems whose behaviour can be 
predicted, and most efficiently predicted, by adopting 
the intentional stance toward them. 
What then of the relation between the two stances, or the 
relation between mechanistic and intentional explanations? 
Dennett argues that what gives rise to the feeling that there 
is some sort of antagonism between them is the absence from 
the mechanistic stance of the presupposition of rationality 
which we make when adopting the intentional stance. But, he 
goes on to argue, the crucial point to be realised is that an 
absence of a presupposition of rationality is not the same as 
a presupposition of non-rationality • 
... from any particular mechanistic explanation 
of a bit of behaviour it would not follow that that 
particular bit of behaviour was or was not a rational 
response to the environmental conditions at the time, 
for the mere fact that the response had to follow, 
given its causal antecedents, casts oomore doubt on 
its rationality than the fact that the computer had to 
answer '108'[(when calculating the product of 18---a:rid 6)] 
casts doubt on the arithmetical correctness of its 
answer (1973:173). · 
Dennett seems to think that it is the relative simplicity of 
the examples that are normally used in this debate that 
enhances the illusion that mechanistic and intentional 
explanations cannot co-exist, but he goes on to point out 
that "this is a case where the philosopher's preference for 
simple examples leads him astray, for of course any simple 
mechanistic explanation of a bit of behaviour will disqualify 
it for plausible intentional characterisation, make it a mere 
happening and not an action, but we cannot generalise from 
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simple examples to complex, for it is precisely the 
simplicity of the examples which ground the crucial 
conclusion"(l973:173). The only thing to be inferred from 
the fact that a system's behaviour can be explained 
mechanistically is not that the system is not rational, but 
rather that the system must in some extended sense be 
tropistic - it can never be designed so as to ensure a 
rational response to every possible set of conditions that it 
might encounter. This means that the system will always be 
imperfectly rational because, as Dennett argues, the notion 
of a perfectly rational system is the notion of an 
7 
unrealisable physical system. 
Dennett here has in mind those philosophers who have argued 
that behaviour which is brought about mechanistically cannot 
by that fact be rational, as witness for instance Alastair 
Macintyre's statement that "if a man's behaviour is rational 
then it cannot be determined by the state of his glands or 
8 
any other antecedent causal factor". There are also the 
arguments of writers like J.B.S.Haldane and C.S.Lewis to the 
effect that determinism (or mechanism or naturalism) is self-
defeating because if everything (including our actions and 
our beliefs) is the outcome of blind and non-rational 
mechanistic causes, then so too is our belief in mechanism 
9 
and hence cannot be thought of as a rational belief. 
The mistake in all these arguments, Dennett points out, is 
7. Dennett (1973:172) offers a thought-experiment involving 
the re-designing of wasps to establish this point, but the 
notion of 'rationality' he uses here, so I shall argue, is 
ambiguou~ and does not establish the point he in fact 
is trying to make. 
8. Macintyre 1957:248. 
9. See Lewis 1964; R.E.Ewin 1968; Flew 1975:92, 229; 
Smart 1963:126-128; Popper and Eccles 1983:75-81. 
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that they al 1 fail to register the fact that the absence of a 
presupposition of rationality is not the ~ as a 
presupposition of non-rationality, and that there is no 
reason for thinking that a piece of behaviour which is 
mechanistically produced cannot also be the rational response 
of that system or organism to its situation at the time. Or 
as Ayer points out in his The Concept of a Person (1964:267), 
there is no reason for supposing that a system cannot operate 
both causally (mechanistically) and according to the laws of 
logic (rationally). To be sure, it will be pointed out, 
assessing the rationality of some bit of behaviour or belief 
is a task entirely independent of any investigation into the 
actual causes of the behaviour or belief,· so that any upshot 
of this latter investigation will be entirely mute insofar as 
10 
the former inquiry is concerned. 
J.J.C.Smart (1963:127) writes as follows: 
[If] determinism is true, then all arguments are 
caused. From this it follows that some causally 
determined arguments must be good arguments. For 
among these causally determined arguments must be 
some which have passed the independent tests for 
rationality. It follows that the argument that 
naturalism is self-defeating is not valid. 
Smart does not say what the independent tests for rationality 
are, but presumably he has in mind the simple checking 
whether or not a conclusion follows logically from some set 
of premises. Thus if a computer is given the information 
that 'All men are mortal' and 'Socrates is a man', and if it 
then goes on to conclude that 'Socrates is mortal', then 
10. This indeed seems to be the general response of all those 
writers who think that the argument that determinism is 
self-defeating is invalid. See for instance Anscombe 
1981A and also footnote 9 above. 
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presumab~y the computer's response is rational even though it 
is causally determined to answer just as it in fact does. 
What Dennett's arguments above have made abundantly clear, it 
seems, is that there is a perfectly straightforward sense in 
which a purely mechanistic system can be said to 'embody' or 
'manifest' what we normally refer to as the intentional 
states that are associated with intentional explanations. In 
this sense, then, mechanistic-and intentional explanations 
are indeed compatible. We need to see, according to this 
view, that intentional explanations are merely an explanatory 
device which neither entail nor presuppose any restrictions 
on the possibility of there also being a mechanistic account 
of behaviour. And while adopting the intentional stance 
toward a system presupposes that the system is (roughly) 
rational, one is not to suppose that the absence of this 
presupposition from the mechanistic stance entails that the 
system in question is therefore non-rational, for, as Dennett 
has argued, nothing about whether a piece of behaviour is a 
rational response or not follows from a mechanistic account 
of its behaviour. 
But it is at just this point, I want to argue, that an 
ambiguity concerning the way the term 'rationality' is used 
begins to manifest itself, and, so I shall argue, once this 
ambiguity has been cl eard up, then a who 1 e lot of what 
Dennett has to say on the relation between mechanistic and 
intentional explanations loses its force and leaves us with 
substantial grounds for still claiming that there is some 
sort of incompatibility between the two. 
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3.2 Designed and Enacted Rationality 
The ambiguity in the notion of 'rationality' as it has been 
used in the discussion above comes out clearly when we ask of 
some particular action or belief whether it is rational or 
not. For what is this supposed to mean? 
Consider the case of belief first. 
When we ask of some particular belief whether it is rational 
or not, then it seems that we could be asking one of two 
possible questions. Firstly, we could be asking whether it 
is in general rational for someone to hold that belief, and, 
secondly, we could be asking whether a particular person is 
rational in holding that belief, and the two sorts of 
questions are very different. 
Take for instance the belief that the world is spherical. 
Now it does seem as though it is in general rational for 
people to hold this belief, and the criteria of rationality 
in this instance are what we might call objective, relating 
to publicly ascertainable data such as the overwhelming 
evidence for the truth of the belief. 
But when we ask whether a particular person is rational in 
holding this belief, then the criteria of rationality are no 
longer objective in the same sense as before, but relate 
rather to the person's entire belief-set in the light of 
which this particular belief may or may not be rational or 
logically justifiable. The person might have in her belief-
set other beliefs among which the belief that there are no 
spherical objects or the belief that only square objects can 
support life may feature. In such a case, even though the 
belief that the world is spherical may be rational (because 
it is true or because it is the best account of the facts), 
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the person herself is not rational in holding that belief. 
Davidson has called attention to this distinction in his work 
on the paradoxes of irrationality by the following sorts of 
remarks: 
Here we must make an obvious distinction between 
having a reason to be a believer in a certain 
proposition, and having evidence in the light of 
which it is reasonable to think the proposition true. 
(Sentences of the form 'Charles has a reason to 
believe that p' are ambiguous with respect to this 
distinction.) A reason of the first sort is 
evaluative: it provides a motive for acting in such 
a way as to promote having a belief. A reason of the 
second kind is cognitive: it consists in evidence one 
has for the truth of a proposition (1985:143). 
And also: 
Much that is called irrational does not make for 
paradox. Many might hold that it is irrational, 
given the dangers, discomforts ... for any person 
to attempt to climb Mt Everest without oxygen (or 
even with it). But there is no puzzle in explaining 
the attempt if it is undertaken by someone who has 
assembled all the facts he. can, given full consider-
ation to a.11 his desires, ambitions and attitudes, 
and has acted in the light of his knowledge and 
values. Perhaps it is in some sense irrational to 
believe in astrology, flying saucers, or witches, but 
such beliefs may have standard explanations if they 
are based on what their holders take·to be the evidence. 
It is sensible to try to square the circle if you 
don't know it can't be done (1982:290). 
The distinction is that between what 'may be called 
externalist criteria of rationality as opposed to internalist 
criteria of rationality. The former appeals to public and 
objective factors, while the latter appeals to what goes on 
within an agent's mind, what his other beliefs, desires and 
attitudes are, and in this sense is subjective rather than 
objective. 
The upshot of al 1 this is that when a person is rational in 
holding some belief, then this is entirely different from 
saying merely that the belief is rational. For in the former 
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case but not the 1 atter there is a requirement that the 
person be internally justified (in terms of her other 
beliefs) in holding that belief, and that is to imply that 
the person holds the belief not merely because the belief is 
capable of being logically justified by external criteria, 
but also that the person holds the belief because she 
recognises it as being logically consequent upon.her other 
beliefs and this, in part, accounts for her present belief. 
(The point here is similar to Davidson's point that a person 
can have a reason for an action, and perform the action, and 
yet this not be the reason on which the person acted.) It is 
her seeing the logical connections that justifies her belief 
and makes her rational in holding it, and this demands that 
she be a conscious agent. 
I now want to consider this distinction in relation to the 
explanation of actions, because it is here that a blurring of 
the distinction can lead to the blurring of a distinction 
between different types of intentional explanations, and this 
can enhance the plausibility of Dennett's compatibilist 
claims. 
Dennett has persuasively argued that in adopting the 
intentional stance toward a system there is no requirement 
that the system really be conscious or really have beliefs, 
desires and intentions. This indeed seems to be true. But, 
I want to show, the rationality which this stance presupposes 
is only of the former 'externalist' kind whereas it is rather 
the second 'internalist' kind of rationality that is crucial 
in our ordinary intentional explanations and, indeed, in our 
ordinary understanding of what actions are. Dennett shows 
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that the former externalist-type intentional explanations are 
compatible with mechanistic explanations, but this goes 
nowhere near showing that the iatter intern·alist-type are 
also. 
The distinction I wish to draw corresponds to the 
externa1.ist/internalist distinct.ion drawn· above and manifests 
itself in the two different types of rationality we may 
suppose to be present in a system when adopting the 
intentional stance toward it. The first type, what I will 
. ' ~ 
refer to as designed-rationality, presupposes no commitment 
as to whether a system really is conscious or has beliefs, 
etc., while the second, enact'ea-rationali ty, it seems, 
necessarily does. Just as one cannot think of a person as 
being rational in holding a particular belief without that 
person actually having perceived t'he logical connections 
between his other beliefs upon which.th~ rationality of his 
. . 
present belief is dependent, so.too ~ne cannot suppose 'that a 
system is rational in the·e~acted-rationality sense without 
supposing that the system is ·conscious and has beliefs, 
de$ires and intentions. 
As an example of designed-rationality, consider the way in 
which I (automatically) withdraw my hand when it accidentally 
comes into contact with a hot stove. This is not a simple 
knee-jerk reflex as when a doctor taps my knee, but is rather 
something which I do as opposed to something which merely 
happens to me. It is not an intentional action, but is an 
action a 11 the same - it is something which I can bring under 
my·. conscious control, or refrain from doing (with a great 
deal of effort no doubt), or ac9uire greater dext~rity or 
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··---·- -- ---~· --- ] 
the laborious framing of the right intentions and the bearing 
in mind of hundreds of little details eventually pays off 
when the ·rational' connections become 'hardwired' into the 
biological or neural system, and you are no longer required 
to think or reason about what you are doing but can manage on 
12 
designed-rationality alone. 
I am not suggesting that these sorts of actions are simply 
like those pieces of behaviour which have some sort of 
biological drive as their source, but only that they are not 
the prime examples of rationality in action. They are rather 
habitual actions which are precisely such as to liberate us 
from the need to forever think and reason about what we are 
doing. We so to speak ·re-design' ourselves by intentionally 
inculcating these sorts of habits, and though this 
're-designing' requires that we be agents capable of 
qperating on ourselves, the performance of these habitual 
actions does not manifest the richness and complexity of the 
rationality involved in full-fledged intentional action. 
There is no conscious decision to depress the clutch every 
time the gears are engage4, nor a conscious decision to 
accelerate at just the right point during this procedure. 
One just does this, and the reasons for doing it -
and there are objectively good reasons - are not the reasons 
on which one is presently acting, for though one could state 
them if asked, they have as it were become incorporated, 
submerged, in one's character or nature. They are 
12. See Charles Taylor 1970:76. See also Matson 1976:146 .for 
a similar set of examples making the same point. 
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objectively present in the nature of the person so acting 
rather than subjectively and consciously present in his mind 
when he acts. 
Enacted-rationality differs from designed-ra~ionality in that 
it presupposes that a system in fact is conscious, because 
here the criteria of rationality are those I have identified 
13 
as being 'internal' to the system. When behaviour manifests 
enacted-rationality, then the behaviour comes about not 
merely because of certain antecedent states which can be 
described in such a way that the behaviour appears to be a 
rational response of the system at the time, but rather 
because of certain antecedent intentional states which 
rationalise the behaviour from the agent's own point of view. 
In this case, the agent does what she does because she has 
seen that it is the rational thing to do given her 
desires,values and beliefs, and it is rational precisely 
because of this perception of the logical relations between 
intentional states and not merely because there objectively 
~ these logical relations. 
For example, let us suppose that I find myself in a 
restaurant and it so happens that I want to signal the 
waiter. Suppose also that I believe that by raising my arm I 
13. The distinction drawn here between designed and enacted-
rational i ty has a rough parallel with the distinction 
Taylor draws between those teleological explanations 
which are merely teleological and those which are also 
intentional, including as an essential feature the 
agent's own description and perception of what it is 
doing (Charles Taylor 1964:54-71). Taylor seems to 
think that only the latter can qualify behaviour as 
action. See also Boden 1978:39-52. 
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can signal the waiter. Suppose further that I do in fact 
raise my arm. Now we would normally be inclined to say that 
this action of raising my arm is objectively rational given 
the desires and beliefs that I do have. But the trouble is 
that this is not enough to make me rational in my action, 
because it might just be the case that I am unaware of the 
logical connection between the contents of my desire and 
belief. It might be the case that I just somehow fail to 
connect up.these two intentional states. So in order for me 
·to be rational in raising my arm something more is required 
than there just being a logical connection between my various 
intentional states, and this something is precisely that I 
see the logical connection between the desire and the belief 
14 
and this seeing accounts for why I did what I did. 
And it is in precisely this way that a reason for the action 
can become !!!Y reason for performing it. And this, it seems, 
requires some sort of mentality or consciousness. 
And it is in this sense that a computer (at least not of the 
sort we are presently familiar with) can never be rational in 
doing whatever it is that it does. Our regard for the 
apparent rationality of the computer lies not in its logical 
manipulation of concepts and symbols, but rather in its 
mechanical manipulation of physical tokens which we regard as 
standing for symbols and concepts and as being logically 
15 
related. 
14. See A.Shutte 1984:484 for a fuller discussion of this 
point. 
15. For a similar point see Dretske 1985:24-27. 
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3.3 Two Sorts of Intentional Explanations 
From the discussion above it should be clear enough that the 
sort of rationality Dennett has in mind when he asks us to 
regard a computer as an intentional system is the sort of 
rational~ty I have described as designed-rationality. It is 
the sort of rationality that does not require that the system 
in question be a conscious agent, but only that it be capable 
of being described in such a way that its behav.iour can be 
seen to be rational in the light of intentional states we 
ascribe to it. 
And Dennett has, I think, shown that there is no 
incompatibility between regarding behaviour as rational in 
this sense and there also being a mechanistic.explanation of 
the system's behaviour. For being rational in this sense is 
merely being a system which can be described as operating in 
accordance with logical principles. There is no requirement 
here that the system itself perceive the logical connections 
between its various intentional states. 
Thus it does seem plausible to suppose that there indeed is a 
mechanistic explanation of the automatic withdrawal of my 
hand from a hot s.tove. We can suppose that there is a fairly 
complex neurophysiological and biological story to be told 
which can explain this event, and this in no· way impugns our 
conviction that the behaviour for all that is rational and 
can also be explained in terms of various desires and beliefs 
which I may be said to have. 
But it is not at all clear that Dennett's argument shows that 
behaviour which is rational in the enacted-rationality sense 
can be explained both intentionally and mechanistically. For 
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here, so I have argued, behaviour comes about not merely in 
accordance with logical principles, but partly at least 
because the agent herself has seen something rational in 
acting the way she does given just the intentional states she 
recognises herself as having. The logical connection between 
what the agent wants and how she sees herself as getting it 
given her present situation is ·mediated through the agent's 
present awareness or state of consciousness and not through 
some biological mechanism which links up appropriate 
responses to stimuli in a rigid and deterministic fasion - as 
in the withdrawal of my hand from a hot stove. 
Why this is a problem for Dennett's·account of the relation 
between mechanistic and intentional explanations is just that 
the only sort of -intentional explanation he seems to allow 
for is that which is entirely compatible with the absence of 
any mentality whatsoever in the system whose behaviour is 
being explained. Now while it is surely right to insist that 
we often do employ intentional explanations of this sort, 
namely the sort which assumes only designed-rationality to be 
present in a system, it nevertheless seems clear that this is 
not the only sort of intentional explanation that there is. 
For we often perform actions, all our intentional actions, 
which involve enacted-rationality, and in the explanation of 
these from the intentional stance we do assume that the 
system in question in fact is a conscious agent which does 
really have desires and beliefs irrespective of how these are 
realised in the physical hardware of the system if at all. 
If there are to be intentional actions, then it would seem 
that there also has to be mentality. 
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That Dennett is dealing with the externalist or designed 
conception of rationality becomes even more apparent when he 
rejects the view that a physical system can be a perfectly 
rational system (1973:172). He writes: 
What conclusion should be drawn from this about human 
behaviour? That human beings, as finite mechanical 
systemsr are not rational after all? Or that the 
demonstrable rationality of man proves that there will 
always be an inviolable terra incognita, an 
infinite and non-mechanical mind beyond the grasp of 
physiologists and psychologists? It is hard to see 
what evidence could be adduced in support of the 
latter conclusion ... since for every awe-inspiring 
stroke of genius cited in its favour (the Einstein-
Shakespeare gambit), there are a thousand evidences of 
lapses, foibles, bumbling and bullheadedness to suggest 
to the contrary that man is only imperfectly rational. 
Perfection is hard to prove, and nothing short of 
perfection sustains the argument. 
Dennett is probably right about most of this, but the peculiar 
thing is that he seems to have misunderstood the type of 
rationality that has seemed in the eyes of many writers to be 
threatened by mechanism. For it is not, as has already been 
conceded, the objective or externalist type of rationality 
that is in question, but rather the internalist or enacted 
type of rationality that seems to be.at odds with complete 
mechanistic explanations of our behaviour. The point is that 
even though what a person does may be objectively irrational 
in the sense that it is just si 11 y or stupid or contrary to 
. 
our common sense, the person nevertheless has to be in some 
sense rational in order for it to be true that she did it. 
Davidson, for one, has pointed out repeatedly that all 
16 
intentional actions have something rational at their core, 
and the reason for this should now be clear. For in order 
for a bit of behaviour to count as an intentional action, 
16. Davidson 1982:293. 
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there has to be a desription of it, namely the agent's own 
account of what she was doing, under which her desires and 
beliefs rationalise the action .. The rationality resides not 
in the act which was done, but in the mind of the agent who 
performed the action. She has to see something rational in 
her action given her desires and beliefs - it is not enough 
that there just be something rational from our point of view. 
When Macintyre says that "if a man's behaviour is rational 
then it cannot be determined by the state of his glands or 
any other antecedent causal factor", then it is not the 
objective rationality of what the man does given certain 
desires and beliefs attributed to him that is in question, 
but.rather the rationality of the man himself because in 
order for him to be rational he has to act, partly at least, 
because he sees that it is the logical thing to do and this 
seeing is a causal factor in explaining why he did it. And 
it is this internal rationality which is threatened by 
mechanism because the man's internal rationality is 
apparently shown to be causally irrelevant to the motions of 
17 
his body which in fact come about. But this, it seems, would 
undermine the very possibility of intentional action, because 
it is this type of rationality, enacted-rationality, rather 
than the externalist or designed type of rationality which is 
crucial in our understanding of what intentional actions are. 
17. See Shutte 1984. I am not suggesting here that logical 
relations cannot be explicated in terms of causal pro-
cesses, for while I think that this is true and 
·constitutes a problem for any materialist position, my 
concern here is just to show that Dennett does not seem 
to appreciate that our rationality differs in an 
important respect from the demonstrable rationality of 
computers and the like. See Madell 1986:160-164 for 
an account of the former issue. 
83 
Dennett is mistaken in thinking that the adoption of the 
intentional stance toward a system presupposes ,no commitment 
to regarding that system as a conscious agent. This would be 
true if the only intenti.onal stance ~e had was the one which 
assumed only designed-rationality to be present in a system. 
But that does not seem to be the way it in fact is. For 
it still seems to be a legitimate question to ask of some 
piece of behaviour whether it was an intentional action or 
not, and this question cannot simply be answered by saying 
that we can regard the behaviour as though it was an 
intentional action by ascribing beliefs and desires to the 
system whose behaviour it is. For that is not enough to make 
something an intentional action. As Michael Levin has 
pointed out (although in a slightly different context): 
The ease with which we predict the behaviour of a 
chess-playing computer by thinking of it as wanting 
and planning may indeed be evidence that the computer 
really wants and plans to win. But this sort of 
ascription of intensional states depends on a prior 
understanding of literal instances of wanting and 
planning. Indeed, it sometimes appears that the 
ultimate aim of the as-if strategy is to assimilate 
the ascription of intensional states of ~uman beings 
to the as-if attitude we occasionally take to feed-
back systems. Apart from undercutting itself, such a 
proposal flies i.n the face of the fact that whether I 
fear snakes does not depend on whether observers can 
predict my behaviour if they assume I am. To say I 
fear snakes is not to say something about the most 
convenient way to think of me, but something about the 
way I actually am (1979:171). 
Dennett's instrumentalism does seem to conflate the question 
of whether something in fact is an intentional action with 
the question of what would count as evidence for something 
being an intentional action. The first question is an issue 
concerning the identity conditions for something, the second 
is a question of establishing whether those conditions obtain 
or not. Now it does seem to be true that our usual evidence . 
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for counting a piece of behaviour as an intentional action 
consists in seeing whether in the context it makes sense to 
speak of reasons for the behaviour and not in examining the 
causal ancestry of the physical motions involved. But this 
is a far cry from saying that being an intentional action 
just is a question of it making sense in the context to speak 
of reasons for the behaviour. Flew has argued that we should 
acknowledge our fallibility in this regard (1975:116), for 
there is always, he says, "a theoretical possibility of 
misidentifying a motion as a moving". But this should not 
tempt anyone to think that there is no fact of the matter as 
to whether something is an action or just a mere movement. 
And if some piece of behaviour inf act is an intentional 
action, then the bodily motions involved must, so I argued in 
the previous chapter, be caused at least in part by the 
intentional states which rationalise the action. 
The problem, once again, is that of finding room in a· 
basically physicalistic ontology for the causal efficacy of 
these mental states. And Dennett's variety of compatibilsm 
falls far short of the mark in showing how this is possible. 
For he seems to leave out of his account precisely those 
actions, namely full-fledged intentional actions, which are 
the obvious candidates for failure to be caught in the 
mechanist's net. 
In conclusion, then, it would appear that Dennett's notion of 
an intentional system with its attendant intentional stance 
poses no threat to incompatibilist claims. For the 
incompatibilist can insist that while it may not be true that 
offering an intentional explanation of a bit of behaviour 
rules out there also being a mechanistic explanation of that 
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behaviour, this is so only on the assumption that intentional 
explanations are of a uniform sort. But if what has been 
argued above is sound, then this assumption can no longer be 
sustained, for we have identified two types of intentional 
explanation which employ different conceptions of 
rationality, and while the one type is indeed compatible with 
mechanism, nothing has been said to show that the other is 
also. We can, it would seem, adopt an instrumentalist 
attitude toward our ascription of intentional states to a 
. system if the intentional stance we are dealing with assumes 
only designed-rationality to be present in the system. But, 
I have argued, intentional actions manifest enacted-
rational ity, and enacted-rationality requires that a system 
in fact be a conscious agent. So to show that this kind of 
intentional explanation is compatible with mechanistic 
explanations, one would have to argue, it would seem, that 
the intentional states ascribed to a system, even a conscious 
and rational system (in the enacted-rationality sense), are 
themselves physical states which could thus be referred to 
rather than excluded in a mechanistic explanation. 
One would have to show that an agent's conscious perception 
of logical relations is itself a series of physical events. 
Compatibilism, it seems, cannot be established without facing 




The previous two chapters were attempts to dismiss those 
arguments for explanatory compatibilism which do not rely on 
the suggestion.that desires, beliefs, reasons and intentions 
- in short, all the usual candidates for causes of our 
actions - are themselves events which can thus feature in a 
mechanistic explanation of behaviour. Dennett's 
instrumentalism, of course, has some or other version of 
physicalism as its ultimate aim, but he does not - at least 
not in the works cited - set about establishing explanatory 
compatibilism by explicitly arguing that desires and beliefs 
are themselves physical events. Instead he attempts to show 
that these concepts are merely part of an explanatory 
hypothesis we adopt towards the behaviour of certain systems, 
and the explanatory hypothesis in no way requires that a 
system really has desires or beliefs or even be conscious. , 
This strategy fails however, and the reason it fails is that 
it seems to ignore features which are essential to and partly 
constitutive of intentional action, namely genuine mentality 
and enacted-rationality. So the ultimate problem for the 
compatibilist remains that of showing how the causal efficacy 
of the mental can be compatible with there also being 
complete mechanistic explanations of our behaviour. 
In his "The Conceivability of Mechanism" Norman Malcolm 
presents an argument for explanatory incompatibilism which 
closely parallels the argument I set out at the end of 
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Chapter One. Malcolm's argument, roughly, goes like this: if 
we say that somebody climbed a ladder because he wanted to 
retrieve his hat from the roof, then this explanation is 
understood to have certain counterfactual implications for 
example, that had he not wanted to retrieve his hat then he 
would not have climbed the ladder. And this is usually 
understood as implying that the man's intention to retrieve 
his hat was causally relevant to his motions up the ladder. 
But now, should there be a complete mechanistic explanation 
of his movements up the ladder, then this counterfactual 
would not hold at all, for the mechanistic explanation would 
give all the sufficient neurophysiological conditions of 
the man's movements and his intention or desire would not be 
among these. Thus, Malcolm concludes, if there is a 
complete mechanistic explanation of the man's movements up 
the ladder, then it would not be true that he climbed the 
ladder because he had the relevant desire or intention. Says 
Malcolm: 
Given the antecedent neurological states of his bodily 
system together with general laws correlating these 
states with the contractions of muscles and movements 
of limbs, he would have moved as he did regardless of 
his desire or intention. If every movement of his 
was completely accounted for by his antecedent 
neurophysiological states (his 'programming', then it 
was not true that these movements occurred because 
he wanted or intended to get his hat (1968:52). 
Malcolm's argument has, of course, been objected to by many, 
and the crux of these objections seems to be that Malcolm 
does not take seriously enough the suggestion that human 
behaviour can be described and explained from within two 
1. See for instance Goldman 1970:157-169; Larry Wright: 
130-132; Long 1979:130-140. 
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different levels of explanation, namely the intentional and 
the mechanistic, assuming as he does that these would always 
be rivals. But the problem is that in order for two 
explanations (or two causes) to be rivals, they would have to 
be, as Flew says, rivals for the occupation of the same area 
of logical space. That is, they must be competitors at the 
same level of description and explanation. But this would 
involve us regarding intentions or desires and beliefs or 
agents as such, rather than their neurological correlates, as 
likely causes of physical and neurological events, and this 
would be extremely weird indeed. It would be resorting to an 
undiluted Cartesian dualism according to which mental events 
as such can effect physical changes. Douglas Long expresses 
the point quite succinctly: 
A sufficient neural explanation of a movement excludes 
as causes of that movement all and only those other 
events which are competing causes. By a competing 
cause I mean one which can intelligibly be supposed to 
have produced that effect instead of its actual cause. 
For a neural account to occupy tne explanatory place of 
the man's intentions, such intentions would have to be 
at least in the running as causes of bodily movements in 
a way that rivals physiological explanation. The two 
must be competitors at the same l eve 1. But the idea 
that an intention, as such, and not some physiological 
correlate of it, can cause a physical event like a 
motion of a hand is incoherent (1979:133). 
In Chapter One I argued that there cannot be two unrelated or 
independent causal explanations of an event where these 
explanations are full explanations, citing necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the occurance of the event. The 
reason was that if causes Cl and C2 are both necessary and 
sufficient for the occurance of event E, then causes C3 and 
C4 cannot also be both necessary and sufficient for E because 
this would contradict the idea that Cl and C2 are necessary 
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and sufficient. 
The problem, then, with the idea that mechanistic and 
intentional explanations are not rivals because they are 
explantions at two totally different levels is that of 
accounting for how these two levels of explanation are 
related, beeause related they have to be. If the man's 
intention to retrieve his hat is a causal factor in 
explaining his movements up the ladder, and if his movements 
up the ladder can also be completely explained by citing 
neural and muscular events sufficient for bringing about 
movements, then there has to be some relation between these 
two explanations if we are to avoid some sort of causal 
2 
overdetermination or epiphenomenalism. The question is how. 
I now want to consider two general proposals for how these 
two sorts of explanations can be related in the hope of 
showing that neither of them are satisfactory. The first, 
the so-called Correlation thesis, postulates that each and 
every mental event is correlated with a specific physical 
event such that there are psycho-physical laws which state, 
for example, that any entity will be in a state of having the 
intention to retrieve a hat at time t if and only if it is in 
3 
a certain physical (neural) state N at time t. The second 
proposal, the Identity thesis, postulates that each and every 
2. McGinn 1979:40. 
3. Like the Identity thesis, the Correlation thesis comes in 
a number of guises. One may hold that the psycho-physical 
laws hold across the board such that every kind of mental 
event is correlated one-to-one with a specific kind of 
neural event, a view that is currently unpopular and 
probably false anyway given the so-called multiple 
realisability of mental states~ Or one may hold that 
these laws are species-specific, or that the psycho-
physical laws will be different for each individual. 
See Goldman 1970:162-164. These different positions, 
I think, are irrelevant to my discussion. 
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mental event is identical with some or other physical 
event such that there may or may not be (depending on which 
version of the Identity theory one opts for, namely the Type 
or the Token Identity theory) a systematic way of translating 
the mentalistic language into the language of physical 
events. 
Let me deal with the Correlation thesis first. 
According to this view, a person can only be in a certain 
intentional state if the person also is in a correlated 
neural state in the sense that being in that specific neural 
state is both necessary and sufficient for being in that 
intentional state. From this it would follow that a person 
could not have the intention to retrieve a hat if the 
correlated neural state did not occur·as well, and hence 
there being a neurological account of a person's movements 
would not exclude there also being an intentional explanation 
of his behaviour. Long writes as follows: 
(If) it is possible to accept this minimal physicalism, 
it is possible to suggest that had the man not wanted 
his hat, certain crucial physiological events would not 
have occurred which did in fact take place, and had they 
not taken place his legs and arms would not have moved 
on the ladder as they did. Hence, although the 
neurological account quite properly does not mention 
his intention, it is not accurate to say, as Malcolm 
does, that it explains the movements 'without regard 
to his intention' (1979:132). 
Alvin Goldman seems to present a similar argument in his 
4 
rejection of Malcolm's incompatibility thesis. Goldman 
introduces the notion of what he calls "simultaneous nomic 
equivalents" and argues that if there is a law stating that 
4.Goldman 1970:161-164. 
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any object O has property X at time t if and only if O has 
property Y at time t, then O's having X at time t is a 
5 
simultaneous nomic equivalent of O's having Y at t. He then 
goes on to argue that if two events Cl and C2 are 
simultaneous nomic equivalents, then if Cl is necessary and 
sufficient for a further event E, then, by the principle of 
the subsitutivity of necessity, so also is event C2 necessary 
and sufficient for event E. And this would mean that if 
there are psycho-physical laws which could render intentional 
and neurological states as simultaneous nomic equivalents, 
then it would follow that a man's movements up a ladder can be 
caused by his intention to retrieve his hat and also by the 
neurological state which is its simultaneous nomic 
equivalent. 
The problem with all of this, however, is that even though we 
may agree that, in the example above, C2 is in some sense 
necessary for E, this does not by itself show that C2 is 
causal.!_y necessary for E as was intended. Goldman wants to 
hold that there could be laws of nature such that a man's 
intention to retrieve his hat is a simultaneous nomic 
equivalent of a certain neural state N occuring in the man's 
brain. And he also wants to hold that the man's intention to 
retrieve his hat caused his movements up the ladder. But the 
problem is that causes are usually understood to not only 
precede their effects, but also to have direction. 
If events A and Bare causally related, then it cannot, on 
any usual understanding, be the case that A caused B and also 
5. This is not Goldman's precise and exact formulation, but 




that B caused A. Causal relationships are meant to be 
unidirectional. So .if the man's intention caused his 
movements, then presumably we have a case of pure mental 
causation as in the old Cartesian picture and Goldman surely 
does not want to argue for that. He rather wants to say that 
the intention can be construed as a cause precisely because 
it is a simultaneous nomic equi val.ent of a neural· event which 
causes the appropriate physical movements. But does this 
show that the intention is causally necessary for the man's 
movements? I do not see how it can. It will not do to say, 
as Goldman does, that: 
the grounds for saying that C2 is necessary for E are 
precisely those presupposed in saying that Cl is 
necessary for E. Cl is said to be necessary for E 
because, given the laws of nature, the omission of 
Cl (at t) would have meant that the events at t 
would not be sufficient for the occurence of E. 
Similarly, given the laws of nature, the omission of 
C2 (at t) would have meant that the events at t would 
not be sufficient for the occurence of E. Given the 
laws of nature, the omission of C2(at t) would have 
necessitated the omission of Cl (at t). And the 
omission of Cl as we have seen, would have resulted 
in the non-occurence of E (1970:162) . 
For suppose that there is a law of nature that all and 2.!!!Y 
oranges have five pips, and suppose further that there is a 
law of nature such that only oranges can be used for treating 
some particular disease D, then it follows that an object can 
only have the property of being a cure for D if it also has 
the property of having five pips. An object's having the 
property of being able to cure D would on Goldman's criterion 
be a simultaneous nomic equivalent of an object's having five 
pips. But I do not think that any of us would be inclined to 
accept the view that this is enough to show that an object's 
having five pips is therefore a cause of a patient's being 
c~red of D, nor would we be inclined to accept the view that 
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an object's having five pips is causally necessary to 
whatever curative effects it might have. Of course it would 
be true that unless an object had five pips then it could not 
be a cure for D, but the reason for this need not be that 
having five pips is causally necessary for the curative 
properties of oranges, but rather that unless an object had 
five pips then it could not possibly be an orange and there 
is something else about oranges - their chemical structure 
say - which p 1 ays a causa 1 ro 1 e in curing D. 
To make thehaving of five pips a causally salient feature of 
an orange'scurative properties we would need not merely a law 
correlating oranges with objects having five pips, but a law 
which specifies what it is about the having of five pips 
which is causally efficacious in curing the disease. And 
this, I take it, would require at least that some other 
feature of oranges, their chemical composition say, cannot 
completely account for the oranges's curative properties. 
And this would mean that even though an orange's curative 
properties are a simultaneous nomic equivalent of its having 
five pips, these two states of the orange are causal 
competitors at the same level. If the one completely 
accounts for the orange's curative properties,· then there 
can be no 1 aw which shows that the other is 2_ausall:_y 
6 
necessary as well. It might be necessary in some other sense 
of 'necessity', but it cannot be causally necessary and yet 
play no role in bringing about the desired effect. 
I 
6. This example was specifically designed to make the point 
abundantly clear, but for two less outlandish examples 
see w. Robinson 1979:329. 
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The same considerations apply in the case of having an 
intention to retrieve a hat and its alleged neurological 
correlate. That they are simultaneous nomic equivalents 
hardly shows that the intention is causal_!y necess.ary to the 
man's movements up the ladder. His movements are completely 
accounted for by neurological causes and laws, and even though 
it may be true that these neurological causes could not occur 
unless the relevant intention occured as well, this does not 
make the man's intention causal_!y operative in bringing about 
the motions of his limbs up the ladder. The intention could 
just as well be an epiphenomenon, an idle by-product of the 
neural processes which, though nomically related to them, is 
completely determined by them and wholly impotent to causally 
affect the brain states or bring about any movements. The 
7 
problem, as William Robinson has pointed out, is that we 
understand, in principle at least,the physical laws and 
causation involved in brain states bringing about bodily 
movements, but it would seem that in addition to the laws 
correlating brain events with mental events we would need 
psycho-physical laws which show how mental events are 
causally connected with brain or other physical events in 
order to make them causally e£ficacious. Correlating them 
with brain events is not enough. ·Presumably neither Goldman 
nor Long would want anything to do with this kind of psycho-
physical interactionism, but they can only avpid it at the 
cost of admitting that intentions (and the mental life as 
such) are mere epiphenomena after all. They might very well 
be correlated one-to-one with brain states, but their being 
7. William Robinson 1979:328. 
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thus correlated makes them no more causally necessary to 
movements (actions) than movements of my shadow being 
correlated with my physical motions makes them - the shadows 
- causally necessary to th~ physical effects the motions of 
my body bring about. 
It would seem then that the Correlation thesis fails to make 
intentions and the like causally efficacious in those of our 
movements which are our actions. It establishes a kind of 
explanatory compatibilism but only at the price of making our 
intentions causally redundant. It is, therefore, a kind of 
epiphenomenalism, distinct from the older variety in that it 
claims that it would not be true that the history of the 
world would have been the same had there been no mentality 
whatsoever, but an epiphenomenalism nevertheless in that it 
fails to show how mental events as such can be causal 
ingredients of our world. It is interesting, once again, to 
see just what would have to give in order to make this 
view compatible with genuine mental causality. As I argued 
above, there would have to be causal laws linking mental 
events with physical events where the direction of causality 
goes from the mental to the physical. But in order for this 
type of interactionism to be viable, then contra Long, 
intentions would have to be competitors with neural events at 
the same level in the sense that if movements are completely 
explained by the causal efficacy of prior neural events, 
then there could be no causal law which states that 
intentions are somehow also required to get the motions 
going. The only way that intentions could play a causal role 
is if the neural causes do not completely determine the 
movements which in fact come about but require the causal 
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effectiveness of intentions as well. And this, it will be 
recalled, is precisely what the incompatibilist claims: 
there cannot be a complete mechanistic explanation of a bit 
of behaviour where this behaviour is the intentional action 
of an agent, and the reason is just that there being such a 
complete mechanistic explanation of the behaviour is enough 
to show that no intentional states, no mental events, were 
causally efficacious in bringing the behaviour about. I 
conclude, then, that the Correlation thesis on its own 
presents no obstacle to the explanatory incompatibilist 
claims advanced, for instance, by Malcolm in the passage 
quoted above. It sti 11 remains to be seen how this kind of 
physicalism, when combined with mechanism, can get mentality 
into the causal picture. 
One way of doing this, of course, is to claim that the causal 
effectiveness of mental states can be guaranteed if mental 
events are not merely correlated with neural events, but in 
fact are identical with them. In this way, it is believed, 
whatever causal effectiveness neural events have mental 
events will have too. This is the position apparently 
8 
favoured by most explanatory compatibilists. 
Starting with his classic "Actions, Reasons and Causes", 
Donald Davidson, for instance, has developed a persuasive 
account of intentional action which not only gets intentions, 




beliefs and desires back into the causal picture, but 
apparently obviates any mind-body hassles there might have 
been by showing that all these mental items or at least those 
which are causally connected with physical events, are 
themselves physical events which cause our motions along 
physiological lines we can readily comprehend. Davidson's 
view, Anomalous Monism, involves the following three 
10 
seemingly inc;:onsistent propositions: 
1) Some mental events causally interact with physical 
events. 
2) When events are related as cause and effect, then 
there is some strict deterministic.law under which 
these events are subsumed. 
3) There are not nor can there be psycho-physical laws 
which meet the requirements of (2). 
The only way. Davidson argues, that these propositions can be 
rendered consistent is if mental events themselves are 
physical events which can thus feature in strict 
11 
deterministic laws. The way to see this is to realise that 
events related as cause to effect do not have to be 
subsumable by a law which relates them under just any of 
their descriptions, but only that there be some description 
of them under which they are thus subsumable. Thus Davidson 
writes: 
Suppose a hurricane, which is reported on page of 
9. The paper was apparently written with the specific 
aim of reinstating the causal theory after its 
(temporary) demise in the hands of Ryle, Melden, Kenny 
and all those who accepted the now virtually defunct 
Double-Language Theory. See Scarrow 1981:13. 
10. Davidson 1980B. 
11. Davidson 1980B. 
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Tuesday's Times, causes a catastrophe, which is 
reported on page 13 of Wednesday's Tribune. Then 
the event reported on page 5 of Tuesday's Times 
caused the event reported on page 13 of Wednesday's 
Tribune. Should we look for a law relating events of 
these kinds? It is only slightly less ridiculous 
to look for a law relating hurricanes to catastophes. 
The law needed to predict the catastrophe with precision 
would, of course, have no use for concepts like 
hurricane and catastrophe (1980A:17). 
If reasons (or desires and beliefs, intentions, purposing, 
etc) are causes of our actions, then by (2) above, the so-
12 
cal led Principle of the Nomological Character of Causality, 
there must be some description of these under which they can 
feature in a strict deterministic law, and since by (3) 
13 
above, the so-called Anomalism.of the Mental, there "are no 
strict deterministic laws on the basis of which mental events 
can be predicted and expl~ined" (1980B:208), these mental 
events must bear physical descriptions because these are the 
only descriptions of events which can feature in laws of the 
required sort. Thus mental events can enter the causal scene 
because they are identical with those physical events which 
cause our motions. 
Does this strategy work? 
Some recent writers on the topic have argued that it does not 
and the cause of the trouble they all trace back to one 
common source which we have already encountered, namely 
epiphenomenalism. They all argue that one cannot combine 
12. Davidson 1980B:208. 
13. Davidson 1980B:200. Davidson argues at length for 
these two principles in 1980B, and even though these 
can be challenged - see Anscombe 1981B for instance -
it wi 11 not be my aim to do so here but rather to see 
what follows about mental causality once the argument 
has been accepted. 
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non-reductive monism with mechanism without this straightaway 
14 
leading to the epiphenomenalism of the mental. 
Honderich (1982) asks us to consider the following scenario: 
a person places some green French pears on a scale at a 
market, and the pointer of the scale registers two pounds. 
We have a clear case of one event causing another. But, 
Honderich asks, what is it about the pears that causes the 
moving of the pointer? Now it surely is not in virtue of 
their being green and French that the pears cause the pointer 
to move, but rather it is in virtue of their weight that the 
pointer moves. The point is that not every property of an 
event is causally salient to its being a cause of some other 
event, but only those properties which figure in the causal 
law which explains how the two events are causally related. 
Honderich dubs this the Principle of the Nomological 
15 
Character of Causally-Relevant Properties (1982:62). 
Applying this to the alleged causal interaction between mental 
and physical events as Davidson conceives of it, the question 
naturally arises as to which properties of a mental event 
(which is identical with a physical event) are the causally 
salient ones. And this question, Honderich argues, spells 
14. See for example Hess 1981; Honderich 1982, 1983, 1984; 
H. Robinson 1982; A.Skillen 1984. 
15. Similar examples are constructed by Robinson 1982:11 
and by Skillen 1984:521. See also Charles Taylor 
1970:56 for a clear statement of the view. The 
clearest and most convincing example is that of 
Honderich in his "Smith and the Champion of Mauve" 
where he challenges the Anomalous Monist to significantly 
distinguish himself from the man who claims that the 
"mauveness~ of his slippers is causally relevant to 
their keeping his feet warm just because the mauve 
slippers are identical with those that do in fact keep 
them warm. 
100 
"bad news" for Anomalous Monism. 
For if it is the mental properties of the event that are 
causally salient, then this would imply that there are after 
all causal laws which can relate the mental as such to the 
physical, and this wouJ.d be contrary to the thesis of the 
Anomalism of the Mental whereby psycho-physical laws are 
excluded. And without this premise Davidson's argument for 
the identity of mental and physical events would in any case 
fall away. 
But if it is only the physical properties of the mental event 
(which is identical with a physical event) that are the 
causally salient ones, then this would seem to render the 
mental properties of that event causally redundant - just as 
the greeness or the Frenchness of the pears are causally 
irrelevant to the movements of the pointer. And this would 
be a kind of epiphenomenalism. For it would amount to saying 
that the mental properties of an event might well have been 
absent without this in any way affecting the causal efficacy 
of the physical events with which that mental event is 
16 
identical.' 
16. In one of his replies to Honderich on this issue, Peter 
Smith (1984:84) points out that epiphenomenalism has 
traditionally been understood as the view that mental 
events do not cause physical events at all, and 
that Anomalous Monists do not subscribe to this view at 
all, believing as they do that mental events, being 
identical with physical events, do cause physical 
events after all. Honderich's reply (1984:88) is 
simp 1 y that this nevertheless is a kind of 
epiphenomenalism because if fails to give us the 
efficacy of the mental as such, for there is nothing 
in Anomalous Monism which makes an event's mental 
properties relevant to whatever physical events it may 
bring about. And· with this, I think we have to ~gree. 
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It is for this reason that Howard Robinson (1982:10) says 
that Davidson's argument is "ingenious but sophistical", 
because while he affirms the thesis that mental events 
sometimes cause physical events, Davidson "allows it a 
completely unnatural interpretation". Says Robinson: 
He [(Davidson)] asserts ... that every mental event 
is also a physical event, although mental states and 
properties are not identical with any physical states 
or properties. Hence mental events can cause physical 
events,.because they themselves are physical events. 
Thus, if my feeling a pain is identical with brain event 
B, and brain event B causes my hand to reach for my 
leg, then (the event of) my feeling a pain caused me 
to reach to my leg. However, the form of interactionism 
so generated is entirely empty. Indeed to call it 
'interaction' seems disingenuous, for it remains the 
case that the mentality of the event played no part 
in bringing about its effect, and therefore is itself 
inert and epiphenomenal. Further, had the mental been 
absent no difference would have resulted (1982:11). 
Robinson goes on to give·an example - similar to Honderich's 
one of the pears - involving active and inert gases, and 
concludes that the "Davidsonian claim that mental events make 
a contribution, when combined with the admission that the 
mental state does not is fundamentally misleading. That this 
is how we understand causal interaction is shown by the fact 
that it is the lack of this type of contribution which 
justifies us in saying that certain gases are inert"(l982:11). 
Is the charge of epiphenomalism correct? 
An answer to this question is made extremely difficult by the 
fact that some of the issues involved, questions of identity 
and causality for instance, are still being hotly debated. 
There is the dispute between Davidson and Kim about what 
would constitute an adequate criterion for the individuation 
of events, Davidson subscribing to a causal theo~y and Kim 
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17 
to a property exemplification account. 
Davidson's causal theory al lows him to hold that mental 
events can be identical with brain events even though mental 
properties are not identical with physical properties. 
Suppose that this is accepted, then it appears that Davidson 
would still face the problem of having these mental 
properties causally idle or epiphenomenal in whatever causal 
transactions that mental events as physical events might 
engage. This idea is reinforced by the thesis of the 
Anomalism of the Mental whereby nomic connections between 
the mental properties of an event and its physical properties 
are denied, claiming instead that whatever psycho-physical 
generalisations there may be will not be law-like. In one of 
his replies to Honderich, Peter Smith admits that "there are 
no nomological links between a mental event's mental proper-
ties and its causal physical properties in virtue of which it 
produces a certain upshot" (1984:85), and he seems to agree 
that this denial of the "unwanted psycho-physical laws" (83) 
is essential to Anomalous Monism. But how then can the mental 
as mental be brought into the causal picture? It would be 
useless to claim, as Smith appears to, that the efficacy of a 
mental event resides in its being identical with a physical 
event which we know and understand to have causal efficacy. 
For this slogan can be indefinitely repeated without it 
making the slightest difference to the fact that it is only 
the physical properties of an event which do all the causal 
work. In his il 1 uminating "Smith and the Champion of Mauve", 
Honderich compares the situation to that of the man who 
claims that it would be a wonderful confusion to underrate the 
17. Davidson 1980I; Kim 1966; Swinburne 1982, 1986:45-61A 
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mauvish efficacy of his slippers because his mauve slippers 
are identical with the slippers lined with Hibernian fleece 
which keep his feet really warm. Says Honderich: 
The Anomalous Monist can be as wedded as he wants to the 
proposition that of course a mental event in his 
sense causes a physical event. By way of that truth he 
is no nearer getting mental efficacy than the Champion 
of Mauve is to getting mauvish efficacy by going on 
saying that it is the mauve slippers that keep him 
really warm. 
I would conclude, then, that the charge of epiphenomenalism 
can indeed be made to stick, and that this is seriously 
damaging to the Anomalous Monist's case. For while we may 
indeed have our intentions (as physical events) as causal 
ingredients in our world, they are not causally efficacious in 
virtue of being an intention of this or that kind, but rather 
merely in virtue of being a neurological state of some or 
other sort. The causal efficacy (of the event) of my having 
the intention to raise my arm resides not in the intentional 
nature of the state that it is, but rather in its physical 
properties which are, according to the Anomalous Monist, not 
in any law-like or causal connection with the intentional or 
mental features of the event, namely its being an intention 
to raise my arm rather that to brush my teeth or phone Ronald 
Reagan. And this is, as Skillen (1984:520-524) says, to 
relegate the mental to the "realm of appearances", to accord 
"reasons a merely puppet status in respect of their causal 
18 
power". 
Relating all this back to the issue of explanatory 
18. See also Swinburne 1986:100-102. 
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incompatibilism, it would seem then that the incompatibilist 
also has nothing to fear from this Anomalous Monist version 
of physicalism. And the reason is clear: if a piece of 
behaviour can be completely explained mechanistically, then 
the mental properties of the physical events which cause the 
behaviour cannot also be causally involved in bringing the 
behaviour about. They would be, strictly speaking, irrelevant 
to the motions which in fact do come about. And this is 
incompatible with regarding the behaviour as the action of 
an agent. Intentionality and agency, on this view, would 
be causally redundant features of the events thus described. 
And even though the mental properties of the events could in 
some sense be "piggybacking" on the physical events which 
19 
cause the behaviour (the so-called supervenien.ce thesis), this 
would not make them causally effective features of the 
physical events. An incompatibiiist can still insist - and 
with justification - that these sorts of events are not 
properly described as actions. 
The supervenience thesis is meant to be the claim that 
objects or events cannot differ in their mental properties 
while agreeing in all their physical characteristics 
(Davidson 1980E:253). The physical features of an object 
are meant to determine its mental features but not the other 
way round. But I do not see what this claim can come to if 
it is also denied that there are nomological connections 
between the mental and the physical features of an object. 
Without nomological connections their relation would be 
accidental, and if accidental then there would be no reason 
19. The phrase "piggybacking" is borrowed from Melchert 
1986:272. 
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why my intention to phone Ronald Reagan is not a property of 
. 
the physical events which cause my action of brushing my 
20 
teeth. It is for this reason that Honderich says: 
This Anomalous Monism, having denied psycho-physical 
connection, is so far indistinguishable from what we 
al 1 hoped had been put t6 rest, which is to say mere 
psycho-physical parallelism. Will this be followed 
by a revival of Pre-Established Harmony? This 
Anomalous Monist's plight is illustrated by the fact 
that that would be better. It would offer some 
explanation of the fact in question (1984:8~ 
One way out of this is to attempt to reinstate psycho-
physical laws, to find laws which link the having of a 
certain intention to being in a certain physical state. But 
this would be to deny the token-identity thesis and to 
repudiate Davidson's metaphysical argument for the identity 
of mental and physical events. The virtue of Davidson's 
argument was that. it did not rely on science for finding 
invariable correlations between mental and physical events, 
as these were thought to be the only likely grounds for 
mooting an identity rather than mere invariable correlations 
20. Denise Meyerson Taylor (1982) uses this lack of nomic 
connections to argue that the Anomalous Monist 
cannot believe that reasons causally explain 
actions. Her reason is that even though there are 
no laws relating hurricanes to the collapsing of 
bridges under those descriptions, citing hurricanes 
causally explains bridge collapsings because there 
nevertheless is a systematic way of translating from 
these descriptions to descriptions under which there 
would be a law which connects them. But this is not 
available in the case of reasons and actions precisely 
because the generalisations relating the mental to 
the physical are accidental, and hence statements 
"relating beliefs and desires to actions cannot be 
systematically related to statements expressed in 
a physicalist vocabulary". And this would mean that 
there cannot be causal explanation going on, but 
only coincidence. She urges instead that reasons do 
causally explain actions, but for the different 
reason that there are causal laws of the non-mechanistic 




between the two. His argument, instead, relied on denying 
that such correlations could be established~ This, together 
with the common-sense belief that mental events do sometimes 
cause physical events and the metaphysical view that causal 
relations imply laws, yielded the conclusion that each and 
every mental event in causal interaction with physical events 
(and other mental events) is itself a physical event though 
there are no laws linking the mental and the physical under 
these descriptions. But if there are such laws, even 
undiscovered ones, then the argument fails and there is no 
reason, apart from arguments from the unity and simplicity of 
science and our having discovered at least some correlations 
22 
to believe that mental events are physical events. 
Now I do not want to attempt a refutation of the identity 
thesis. It would suit my purpose quite adequately to allow 
that mental events are identical with brain events on the 
condition, only, that mental properties are not identical 
with physical properties. This, together with complete 
mechanism, is sufficient to show that mental properties are 
in fact epiphenomenal and this, I have argued, is just .what 
23 
the incomp~tibilist needs. For it offends against our 
common-sense conviction that it is the mental as mental which 
plays a causal role in our actions. And I have already 
argued in this chapter that mere correlations will not be 
enough to give us the efficacy of the mental. 
21. Davidson 1980B:212. 
22. Smart 1963:11; Armstrong 1981:1-4. 
23. Robinson (1982:10) states this consequence quite 
explicity. 
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So the only way, it seems, that the specifically mental 
properties of events such as (the having of) intentions and 
the like can be incorporated into the causal fabric of the 
physical world, while complete mechanism is also true, 
would be for us simply to hold that mental events and 
properties are themselves physical events and properties, the 
24 
sort of reductive materialism which Smart has advocated. But 
this view seems far less likely to be true than any of the 
other non-reductive versions of physicalism, like the token-
identity theory and functionalism for instance. There are 
powerful objections against it coming from the so~called 
multiple realisability of mental (or functional) states and 
the problem of absent qualia. There is no reason to suppose 
that kinds of mental events are realised by kinds of. physical 
events such that there could be one-to-one correlations 
between them. 'Pains', for instance, could be realised in 
this physical way and then that even though these states 
themselves have nothing in common apart from simply being 
physical states. And it is also conceivable that someone 
could be in exactiy the same physical state as I am when 
feeling pain arid yet that person have a completely different 
mental state. The problem is that the mental properties of 
events just don't seem to be the sorts of things which 
could have a physical essence which could be captured by 
25 
science. 
24. Smart 1959, 1963. The other alternative, of course, is 
simply to deny that there are distinctively mental events 
and properties at all, the eliminative materialist line. 
On this view there would be no problem of compatibility 
at all, for the mentalistic language could simply be done 
away with. It could at most be regarded instrumentalis-
tically, as Dennett has argued it should. But this, I 
think, is wildly implausible. 
25. See McGinn 1982:21-36 for more on this. 
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The view that the mental just is physical is a far harder 
c 1 aim to assess because it just does not seem that we at 
26 
present can understand what it exactly involves. It is not 
just that we do not have any clear idea of how my feeling a 
pain right now can be identical with certain chemical or 
biological goings-on in a certain region of space-time, but 
it is also that we do not have any idea of how such 
apparently objective goings-on can ever amount to what seems 
to be an essentially subjective phenomena. I am referring, of 
course, to Nagel's notion of what it is like to be a 
particular creature or what it is like to experience a 
27 
pain. It is these features of our world that seem doomed to 
forever elude capture in any physicalist net that sets out to 
give an objective or extensional description of what our 
world is like. 
When somebody intentionally performs an action, then common-
sense tells us that this behaviour is preceded by or somehow 
involves a conscious episode in the pyschological life of the 
person so behaving. But it is hard, perhaps impossible, to 
imagine how such a conscious episode can occur without it 
involving this subjective feature, this feature of what it is 
like for the person to intend, desire, believe or act as he 
does. And this feature of consciousness just does not seem 
capable of objective or physicalist desc~iption. It would 
seem then that if a piece of behaviour has been correctly 
identified as an action, then !l2 explanation of that 
26. Skillen 1984:526 and also Melchert 1986:274. 
27. Nagel 1974. See also H. Robinson 1982:4 where he 
argues that this is a fatal objection to physicalism 
of any sort. 
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behaviour which is consistent with the absence of this 
feature can be adequate. For this is just part of what it is 
for a person to act intentionally. It could not be action 
without this feature. 
It is curious that in a recent article defending Davidson's 
Anomalous Monism from the charge of epiphenomenalism, Norman 
Melchert should write as follows: 
There is no necessity attached to interpreting 
behaviour under intentional concepts. We may (in 
principle, at least) view the actions of others 
(and ofourselves) as simply physical events in a 
physical world.But, one could say, from the moral 
point of view one ought toaccord others this dignity, 
to regard them as "intentional systems" with a degree 
of psychological autonomy (1986:273. He specifically 
refers to Dennett's notion of an "intentional system"). 
This, I think is clear enough, is simply another variety of 
28 
Instrumentalism. 
For, given what has been argued above, Melchert seems to be 
saying that we can (if we choose) regard the motions of 
others as actions, but that regarding them as such is quite 
consistent with us also regarding them as mere physical 
events which do not involve any conscious or subjective 
features. But from what was argued in the previous chapter 
(on Instrumentalism) and above, I think it is quite clear 
that no sequence of events which does not involve 
consciousness can rightly be called intentional action. So 
while it is maintained that mental properties cannot be 
nomologically tied to physical properties even though we 
have a criterion of event identity in terms of which mental 
28. Gregori Sheridan (1982:436) counts Davidson among the 
instrumentalists. This, I think, shows why. 
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events can be identical with physical events, it would seem 
that any mechanistic account of behaviour will be compatible 
with the absence of consciousness (and mentality in general) 
as a causal factor in the genesis of that behaviour. But 
such behaviour, I have argued, cannot really be action. And 
this, I have also argued, is just what the explanatory 
incompatibilist insists on. 
The only way to avoid this incompatibilist conclusion would 
be to argue that there are after all nomological connections 
between neurological states and properties and mental states 
and properties. From our knowledge of these nomological 
connections we should be able to infer from descriptions of 
neurological states that an intention of such and such a sort 
or a pain of such and such a phenomenological character is 
occurring in the mind of the person whose brain it is. 
Whether this will ultimately be shown to be possible neither 
I nor anyone else, I think, has any way of knowing. Davidson 
29 
has explicitly argued against this possibility. Others have 
30 
felt less sure. One point of view which many writers on the 
topic have in common is that in order to even see how this 
could be possible we would need a vastly enriched conceptual 
apparatus in order to grasp what precisely this identity 
comes to. And this would seem to involve our developing a 
physical understanding of what thoughts, intentions, pains 
and emotions are, something which we at present just do not 
31 
have. Charles Taylor argues for a "convergence hypothesis" 
29. See his "The Material Mind" (1980E) for instance. 
See also Swinburne 1986:192. 
30. See Meehl 1966 and Skillen 1984. 
31. Nagel 1974; H. Robinson 1982; Melchert 1986. 
111 
whereby "the present principle of neurophysiology, and ~ 
fortiori those of physics and chemistry would be supplemented 
by concepts of quite a different kind, in which, for in::;tance, 
relations of meaning might become relevant to neurological 
process" (l985A:l85). 
Skillen (1984:526) suggests that "it seems that the 
'functionalist' notions of 'storage' and 'information' may be 
the models for 'bridging' concepts that enable us to see 
32 
mental states as physical". But he also warns that "premature 
attempts to provide a 'rough' account of mind in physical 
terms will tend to combine vulgar reductionism with backdoor 
animi~m as homunculi are released into the machinery in the 
attempt to give it the kiss of real life". 
My own view is a lot more pessimistic (from the would-be 
compatibilist's point of view). I think that some or other 
kind of dualism is inevitable, whether this be of mental and 
physical substances (Cartesian dualism) or mental and physical 
prop~rties (the token-identity theory) or functional and 
physical states (functionalism). The case is far harder to 
prove with intentional or propositional states than it is 
with those mental items which involve sensations, such as 
pains, aches, emotions, etc. The reason, as has often been 
33 
noted, is that the propositional states (thoughts, desires, 
beliefs, etc.) are less obviously connected with a first-
person or subjective perspective than are those mental items 
which involve the more sensuous side of consciousness. It is 
• 
32. Though I have argued against it, this nevertheless seems 
to be something both exciting and hopeful in Dennett's 
writing on the topic. 
33. For instance by McGinn 1982:19. See also Baker 1980. 
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far easier, for instance, to think of a computer as 
'believing' or 'desiring' than it is to think of it 
experiencing pain or undergoing some profound emotion. Thus 
it is far easier for us to think of the terms and concepts of 
Artificial Intelligence as providing 'bridging concepts' 
which may eventually enable us to link up processes such as 
remembering, calculating and even believing with complex 
physical processes of the sort going on in a computer when we 
apply these terms to them. But pains and emotions - those 
states which have distinctive phenomenological features - seem 
to be a different matter entirely. They seem to involve 
something irreducibly subjective, and it is hard to see how 
this feature can be referred to or described in a purely 
objective language, as physics· aims to be. While this remains 
the case, I would urge, we have no way of seeing how complete 
mechanism can be true, and so we have reason to believe that 
complete mechanistic explanations of behaviour are indeed 
incompatible.with that behaviour being genuine action, 
involving, as it must, the causal efficacy of these conscious 
episodes. 
Something has to give, and since it cannot be our ordinary 
way of regarding and explaining certain items of 
34 
behaviour as action, it will have to be the belief that 
there in fact can be complete mechanistic explanations of all 
our behaviour. And the only way that this can be secured 
would be if physical determinism in fact is false, at least 
insofar as it applies to those of our motions which we 
regard as our free and rational intentional actions. 





5.1 Summary of the Argument 
In the previous chapters I have presented arguments against 
the view that intentional explanations of behaviour are 
compatible with there also being complete mechanistic 
explanations of that behaviour. In the first chapter it was 
conceded that there has to be some sort of compatibility 
between intentional and mechanistic explanations for the 
simple reason that my intentionally raising my arm most 
certainly does involve certain physiological occurrences 
. J 
which can be explained mechanistically. The question was 
whether these explanations, in the case of an intentional 
action, could be complete, i.e. whether there could be an 
unbroken chain of physical causes, each being a full 
explanation of its effect, going indefinitely back to 
something (an event) outside or independent of the agent 
whose behaviour it is. This possibility was denied, and the 
next three chapters were all attempts to defend this 
conclusion against various sorts of objections. 
In Chapter Two I considered the view that intentional and 
mechanistic explanations are too different to ever be thought 
of as rivals, and that the reality of human action therefore 
leaves untouched the possibility of unlimited success in the 
mechanistic explanation of human motions. This view was 
rejected for the following basic reasons: firstly, it fails 
to come to terms with what we all intuitively believe to be 
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true, namely that our desires, beliefs, reasons and 
intentions do play a ro1e· in bringing about those of our 
motions which are our actions. Secondly, denying that these 
items play a causal role led the double-language theorist to 
a severe problem in accounting for the difference between 
mere bodily movements and those movements which also are 
actions. It was argued that the only way these could be 
distinguished, even at the physical level, was if there is 
some sort of causal difference in the way these two sorts of 
bodily movements are in fact generated. Another problem with 
the double-language theory is that actions often are bodily 
movements, and if these can be completely explained 
mechanistically, then so too can the actions. By 
denying the causal role of intentions and the like the 
double-language theorist must give up on finding any 
significant difference between the two sorts of movements, 
and this seems just plain wrong. Furthermore, it was found 
that the arguments for denying that intentional explanation 
is causal explanation cannot be sustained and that there are 
very good reasons for pref erring some or other version of the 
c~usal theory. It enables us to significantly distinguish 
between actions and mere movements which the double-language 
theory cannot do. 
In the next chapter I discussed the Instrumentalist version 
of compatibilism, but it was argued that this is entirely 
unsatisfactory because it fails to give an adequate account 
of the sort of rationality involved in intentional action. 
Intentional explanations, it was concluded, come in two 
varieties, namely those that do and those that do not make 
assumptions as to whether the system whose behaviour is being 
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explained is in fact a conscious agent. Instrumentalism 
establishes the compatibility with mechanism of only the 
latter sort of intentional explanation, but it is rather the 
former sort of intentional explanation, that which ascribes 
genuine conscious states, that is involved in our ordinary 
understanding and explanation of actions. It was concluded 
that the only viable form of compatibilism would be that 
which attempts to find systematic connections between 
conscious states and physical states. 
In the chapter on Physicalism this last suggestion was 
considered, and the negative conclusion to emerge from that 
discussion was that both the Correlation-thesis and Token-
Identity versions of physicalism fail to make the mental as 
such causally efficacious and hence reduce to a type of 
epiphenomenalism. And epiphenomenalism, I take it, though 
P?Ssibly true, is extremely counter-intuitive. It in any 
case amounts to the view that there are no actions (as they 
are traditionally conceived), but only physical events which 
may or may not be accompanied by conscious occurrences or 
mentality. The only remaining possibility, I concluded, was 
that consciousness and the mental as such (with all its 
subjective features and phenomenological properties) are 
simply physical goings-on which nevertheless are mental as 
well. But I suggested that this view, though probably false, 
is in any case far from being understood. While it may, I 
conceded, ultimately be vindicated by conceptual advances to 
1 
be made in the future, we nevertheless may be justified now 
in believing that incompatibilism is true. 
1~ Popper (1983:205) calls this "promissary materialism". 
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5.2 Actions, Agents and Other Minds 
I 
My aim throughout this discussion has not been to put forward 
a positive thesis about human action and free will, but has 
been concerned with the more modest aim of defending 
explanatory incompatibilism, what I take to be the common-
sense view, against certain powerful and sophisticated 
objections. That task has now more or less been completed. 
\ 
The conclusion we have reached is that intentional 
explanations are indeed incompatible with complete 
mechanistic explanations, and the basic reason for this is 
that complete mechanism, which entails physical determinism, 
fails to find room in its austere picture for what we all 
intuitively accept to be true, namely that our mental lives 
as such make a causal difference to the way the physical 
world is. In order to make room for intentional action, we 
would need to give up the view that there in fact can be 
complete mechanistic explanations of all our behaviour. And 
the only way that this can be possible is if physical 
determinism in fact is false, as libertarians have always 
insisted that it is. That this effectively blocks complete 
mechanism is evident from the fact that if physical 
indeterminism is true, then there cannot be full or complete 
mechanistic explanations for eve~ything that happens in the 
physical world, but only partial explanations which can 
predict and explain to within only a limited degree of 
2 
accuracy. 
Once this has been admitted, then a picture of how human 
2. This was argued for and established in Chapter One. But 
see also Thorp 1980:100. 
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agency and action is possible begins to emerge, and it is a 
picture which neither denies the reality of human free action 
nor places intolerable restrictions on what we may want to 
achieve insofar as a detailed mechanistic account of human 
behaviour is concerned. 
And while I do not want to attempt a rigorous and systematic 
argument or proof that this indeed is the correct picture, it 
nevertheless is incumbent on me to say at least something on 
what I take this picture to be and how it in fact is 
possible. To this I now turn. 
The question that needs to be answered is what the necessary 
and sufficient conditions are for a piece of behaviour being 
an intentional action. So let us construct an imaginary case 
and pursue the question step by step. Let us suppose that we 
observe some behaviour which we then characterise and explain 
as John's raising his arm in order to signal the waiter. 
What would make that behaviour an intentional action ? 
The first condition to be met, one about which most writers 
would agree, must at least be that there is an intentional 
explanation of the behaviour. This in a way is obvious. We 
normally count behaviour as action rather than as mere 
movement not by examining how the behaviour was physically 
produced, but by seeing whether it makes sense in the context 
to speak of reasons the agent might have had in behaving as 
he did. And in the example above this condition is obviously 
satisfied - we say that John raised his arm because he wanted 
to signal the waiter, and this is an intentional explanation. 
But having said this a complication immediately arises. For 
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in the discussion of Dennett's instrumentalist version of 
compatibi l ism it was conceded that there is a kind of 
intentional stance we can adopt toward a system which does 
not commit us to regarding that system as a conscious agent 
or as really having a mental life at all. This is what we do 
when we exp 1 ain the behaviour of a computer by saying that it 
·wants this or desires that. But it has also been argued 
throughout this discussion that having a mental life is 
absolutely necessary for being an agent or for performing 
intentional actions. And this implies that there merely 
being an intentional explanation of behaviour is not enough . 
to confer on a piece of behaviour the status of action. What, 
for example, if in our imaginary case John in fact is a 
zombie with no mental life at al 1 ? Even though we can 
explain and understand his motions as though it was an action 
he performed with the intention 'so to do, this does not 
establish his behaviour as action. Something more is needed, 
something which guarantees, as it were, that John is a 
conscious agent. 
Now it has been argued that this 'something' comes in the 
form of Davidson's insistence that intentional explanations 
not only rationalise the actions which they explain, but also 
that the reasons cited be the reasons on which the agent 
3 
acted. When we say that John raised his arm because he 
wanted to signal the waiter and he believed that by raising 
his arm he would do so, then the desire and belief 
(Davidson's 'primary reason') cited must not only justify the 
behaviour, but they must also be the causes of the behaviour. 
3. Davidson 1980A, 1980C. 
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In this way it is supposed one can get mental events into the 
picture. If it really is true that John's desire and his 
belief caused his behaviour, then this will ensure not only 
that John is a conscious agent, but also that his being 
conscious somehow contributed to his behaviour. He wanted to 
do something, and this wanting caused him to do it. And this 
would make his behaviour an intentional action. 
Now no picture like this can be adequate. And there are 
two basic reasons for this. The first, which we have already 
encountered in the discussion of Davidson's view, is that 
this picture leads straight to the epiphenomenalism of the 
mental, at least that is if one supposes as Davidson does 
that the mental events which cause the physical motions are 
identical with physical events in the· brain. This was argued 
extensively in the previous chapter. But even if one 
supposed that the mental events were somehow non-physical 
(causing the appropriate physical events just at those 
crucial points where they are not wholly caused by antecedent 
brain states), even then this picture could not work. And 
the reason is, as Davidson himself points out, that a 
person's desires and beliefs may cause his behaviour but in a 
totally weird or deviant way such that we would not call the 
behaviour an intentional action. This is the so-called 
Problem of Deviant Causal Chains. Davidson offers his own 
4 
example: 
A climber may want to rid himself of the weight and 
danger of holding another man on a rope, and he might 
know that by loosening his hold on the rope he could 
rid himself of the weight and danger. This belief 
4. For similar examples see McGinn 1979:33 and Richard 
Taylor 1966:249. 
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and want might so unnerve him as to cause him to 
loosen his hold, and yet it might be the case that 
he never chose to loosen his hold, nor did he 
do it intentionally (1980J:79). 
In this case the desires and beliefs rationalise the 
behaviour and they al so cause it, but they cause it in an 
uncharacteristic or deviant manner such that the resulting 
behaviour is not an intentional action. But how, we can 
fairly ask, is the desire-belief version of the causal theory 
to exc 1 ude cases such as these ? How is it to give an 
account of what the 'characteristic' or 'right' way is in 
which desires and beliefs are meant to cause actions ? 
• 
Goldman has written: 
To this question, I confess, I do not have a fully 
detailed answer. But neither do I think that it is 
incumbent on me, qua philosopher, to give an 
answer to this question. A complete explanation of 
how wants and beliefs lead to intentional action would 
require extensive neurophysiological information, and 
I do not think it is fair to demand of a philosophical 
analysis that it provide this information (1970:62). 
But one has the distinct feeling that Goldman is here simply 
passing the buck. And this, as Swinburne and Bishop have 
also pointed out, is entirely unsatisfactory. Bishop writes: 
Now, it is obvious that our concept of intentional 
action has some empirical features. And it could 
hardly be denied that there are important neoro-
physiological differences between genuine intentional 
action and its deviant semblance which are still to 
to be discovered. But the event-causalist [(by which 
Bishop means the desire-belief theorist)] is here 
envisaging that there are features in our concept of 
non-deviant intentional action which are both empirical 
and unknown. But this cannot be. If one makes some 
distinction on empirical grounds, then we must know 
something at least of what those empirical grounds 
are ( 1983: 68) . 
Bishop, I think, has a point here. The difference between 
intentional action and its deviant semblance is something 
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that concerns our explanations of behaviour at the ordinary 
and everyday level of intentional explanation, for it is at 
this level that we understand or grasp that there is a 
difference here. It is not as though the difference is a yet 
to be verified empirical one. Swinburne makes more or less 
the same point in his comment on the passage from Goldman 
above: 
But this really will not do. For hundreds of years 
men have been able to distinguish, among cases where 
wants cause the events wanted, those cases where an 
action was performed. We have distinct concepts which 
we know how to apply. It is indeed incumbent upon a 
philosopher to analyse the difference - although it is 
not up to him to say which neurophysiological goings-on 
are physically necessary to produce a case of an action 
being performed. Goldman has not analysed the 
difference (1979:4ln). 
I would conclude that although there is something very right 
about this version of the causal theory, the belief-desire 
model nevertheless fails to offer an account of the 
sufficient conditions of intentional action. In our own 
story constructed before this digression, it might well be 
the case that John's desire to signal the waiter is so great 
that it makes him so anxious with the result that a muscular 
spasm causes his arm to go up. And this seems to 
indicate that it cannot simply be a matter of the desires and 
beliefs causing the actions they rationalise - they must 
also cause it in the right way. But the desire-belief 
theorist, I think, will never come up with a philosophical 
5 
account of what that right way is. The problem, I would 
5. Christopher Peacocke (1979) has apparently developed an 
account of intentional action which is said to hold out 
considerable hope of providing just the sort of deviance-
excluding analysis which is required for the belief-desire 
theory. I must quite frankly confess that I do not 
understand his argument. But see Bishop 1981 and 1983 for 
a discussion and rejection of his theory. 
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suggest, is that no clauses can be added to the basic view 
which do not, in some way or another, make a reference to the 
agent's causing something or other that is required for 
6 
intentional action. But I will say something more on this in 
a short while. 
At the moment I want to proceed with our search for the 
necessary and sufficient conditions of intentional action, 
and the position we have reached is roughly as follows: 
firstly, there must be no complete mechanistic account of the 
behaviour, because this will exclude there also being 
causally efficacious mental antecedents of the behaviour, and 
this, I have argued throughout, is absolutely essential for 
intentional action. The next condition that has to be met is 
that there must be an intentional explanation of the 
behaviour. But this condition needs to be bolstered in order 
to exclude those cases where there may be an intentional 
explanation of the behaviour which is quite compatible 
with their being no mentality involved at all. The desire-
belief account of intentional explanation was thought to 
provide this extra condition, but it is also not adequate for 
one of two reasons or both: either it leads to the inefficacy 
and redundancy of the mental and it faces insuperable 
problems because of the possibility of deviant causal chains, 
or, in the case of mental events not being identical with 
·physical events, it still faces problems connected with 
deviant causal chains. Something more is definitely needed, 
something which does not have problems of deviant causal 
chains and which also ensures the efficacy of the mental. 
6. For a detailed account of this see Bishop 1983. 
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Now this something, I believe, comes in the form of the 
theory of agency. It says that those motions which 
are intentional actions are caused, not by antecedent 
mental events or physical events, but by the agents whose 
actions they are. This satisfies all our conditions to date. 
It satisfies the condition that there be no complete 
mechanistic explanation of the behaviour, because there would 
be no need for introducing the concept of agent-causation if 
all our motions were fully caused by antecedent physical 
events. It also satisfies the condition that there be an 
intentional explanation of the behaviour. We say that John 
raised his arm because he wanted to signal the waiter, and by 
this we could understand that John brought about or caused 
the relevant motions of his body which constituted his 
signalling, and he brought this about because he wanted X and 
believed that by Y-ing he would get X. John's reasons here 
can be thought of as causes which do not operate on his body 
or his brain, but on him. 
What is right about the belief-desire theory is that it 
attempts to get the mental into the causal picture, but it 
fails to do this in a satisfactory way. For not only is 
there the problem of wayward causal chains, but it appears 
unable to do justice to the rationality which is involved in 
intentional action. What I mean is this: for a piece of 
behaviour to .be an intentional action, on this belief-desire 
view, the agent's belief and desire must not only rationalise 
and cause the behaviour, but it also has to be true that 
these beliefs and desires rationalise the behaviour from the 
agent's point of view. This was argued in the discussion of 
Instrumentalism where I drew the distinction between designed 
and enacted-rationality. Take our case above. Suppose that 
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John wants to signal the waiter and he also believes that by 
raising his arm he would signal. Suppose that John also 
raises his arm. Now if the desire and belief are to cause 
the behaviour such that it is an intentional action, then 
they cannot do so as disjointed or separate events which are 
held, as it were, in separate compartments of his mind. In 
order for him to be rational in behaving as he does these two 
intentional states somehow have to come together in his 
consciousness. He must see the logical connection between 
them. But it is this fact about what it is to be rational in 
action which, I think, stands opposed to any attempt to 
analyse action in purely event-causal terms. The 'right' way 
in which desires and beliefs must cause the actions they 
rationalise must be through or via the consciousness of "the 
agent who acts. It is here, in the consciousness of the 
agent, that the rationality is to be found. It is this, I 
believe, which lies behind Richard Taylor's view when he 
writes: 
When I believe that I have done something, I do 
believe that it was I who caused it to be done, I 
who made something happen, and not merely something 
within me, such as one of my own subjective states, 
which is not identical with myself. If I believe 
that something not identical with myself was the 
cause of my behaviour - some event wholly external 
to myself, for instance, or even one internal to 
myself, such as a nerve impulse, volition, or what-
not - then I cannot regard that behaviour as an act 
of mine, unless I further believe that I was the cause 
of that external or internal event (1983:48). 
The cl aim I am making is that no number of clauses excluding 
deviance in the causal chain from intentions to behaviour can 
work if they do not at some point refer to the agent's doing 
something - his believing, his desiring, his noticing, etc. 
How else can it be the action of an agent ? Surely not just 
by being caused by events which somehow involve the agent! 
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What is required is the agent's own involvement, and I see no 
way of breaking this up into separate events which can then 
somehow be stuck together so as to make an action. It is as 
absurd, I believe, as trying to analyse the notion of 
'activity' by saying that it is essentially constituted by a 
group of separable events which are all intrinsically 
7 
passive. 
I take it then that we have to introduce some such notion as 
8 
that of agent-causality. What we have then is the view that 
a piece of behaviour is an intentional action if it was 
brought about by an agent meaning so to do. The 'meaning so 
to do' can be understood as saying that the agent did what he 
did because he wanted to do it, where this can be understood 
as saying that the want caused him to do it. And it is clear 
that no problem of deviant causal chains can arise in such a 
case. For if the agent did it, even in the case of non-basic 
action where an agent does something by doing something else, 
then it would be true that no other event caused whatever it 
was that came about. In Davidson's example of a deviant 
causal chain involving the climber who wants to rid himself 
of the danger of holding another man on a rope, we may ask 
what exactly it is that the agent did. He desired and he 
believed to be sure, but what action did he perform? The 
7. See Thorp 1980:110-115 for a fascinating discussion of 
this issue. 
8. This idea has been advocated in recent years most notably 
by Chisholm (1976;1982) and Richard Taylor (1966;1983). 
Others who have defended something like it include 
Wiggins (1973), Popper and Eccles (1983), Thorp (1980), 
Bishop (1983), Ferre (1973) and then even Aristotle, 
Aquinas and Thomas Reid. See Chisholm (1976) for ~hese 
historical claims. 
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answer, of course, is no action at all. And the reason is 
clear. There was no instance of agent-causality in this 
case. 
The virtues of introducing a concept such as agent-causation 
are clear. It helps the libertarian find a middle-ground 
between simple indeterminism or randomness and causal 
determination, for instead of actions being causally 
determined by antecedent events or being simply uncaused as 
such, the agent-causal account of action says that those of 
our bodily motions which are actions are indeed caused, but 
caused by the agents whose actions they are. This then 
constitutes a reply to Ayer's view that the libertarian is 
caught in an inescapable dilemma: either actions are causally 
necessitated by antecedent events or they are the result of 
random and capricious events, and in neither case can they be 
9 
viewed as free and responsible actions. 
But the a~ent-causalist can reply that of course the 
alternatives that Ayer suggests are not exhaustive. Though 
physically non-necessitated, our actions can indeed be caused 
by us in such a way that they are intelligible at the 
intentional rather than the physical level. 
But the disadvantages of the view are also quite clear. 
For it involves us postulating a rather obscure notion of v 
causality alongside the event-causal notion which we seem to 
know and handle so well. And if anything, the notion of 
agent-causation is indeed mysterious. How is it supposed to 
9. Ayer 1982:10. 
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work ? And how are we supposed to detect its presence ? Why 
should we just not say that an event is simply uncaused 
rather than say that it is physically uncaused but agent-
caused all the same ? 
Before attempting something like an answer to these 
questions, a rather long digression reviewing once again some 
of the ground we have covered will be in order. 
We have already seen that physical indeterminism is a 
necessary condition for intentional action. And we have also 
seen that intentional intelligibility is another. Might 
these two conditions not be enough for something being an 
intentional action ? 
David Wiggins has suggested that perhaps all we need to 
regard behaviour as the free and intentional action of an 
agent is that it come about non-deterministically but that it 
nevertheless be "coherent and intelligible in the low-level 
terms of practical deliberation", i.e. that it submit to 
10 
successful intentional explanation. 
Now while Wiggins is suggesting two conditions which, I 
believe, are necessary for intentional action, these two 
conditions by themselves cannot be jointly sufficient for 
something being an intentional action. And the reason is 
that we may suppose it to be possible that there be a 
physically indeterministic system which even though it is 
utterly devoid of mentality or consciousness, can 
nevertheless be described and (partly) explained by adopting 
the intentional stance toward it. 
10. Wiggins 1973:52. 
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Being entirely devoid of mentality, it cannot rightly be said 
to act at all. But how are we meant to know this ? How are 
we meant to know that such a system which can be 
intentionally described and explained is nevertheless devoid 
of mentality ? Wouldn't there being an intentional 
explanation of its behaviour together with the fact that it 
is physically indeterministic constitute sufficient evidence 
for us to believe that it 'has a mind' and is therefore 
capable of genuine action ? 
The answer to this, I believe, should be in the .affirmative. 
For it would be too strange, too much of a coincidence if a 
physically indeterministic system also behaved in such a way 
that it could be understood and interacted with by adopting 
the intentional stance toward it if it was not also the case 
that the system operated from within the perspective of its 
own individual psychology. Something like this, I believe, 
is probably true. It would be too much of a brute 
coincidence if a system was not 'minded' but was also 
physically indeterministic and intentionally intelligible. 
But we are not to confuse evidencing conditions with criteria 
11 
of identity. It may be the case that the only evidence we 
have for an object's possession of X is its possession of Y, 
but we are not to be tempted into saying that its possession 
of X is therefore constituted by its possession of Y, that is 
unless we knew that an object could not possibly possess x if 
it did not also possess Y. But in the case we are discussing 
this does not seem to be the case. That a system can be 
described and understood by adopting the intentional stance 
11. Swinburne 1986:155. 
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toward it is evidence that it 'has a mind', but its having a 
mind is not constituted by this fact. We can readily imagine 
cases - computers, for instance - where this is not 
sufficient for a system in fact 'having' or 'being a mind'. 
That a system is also physically indeterministic would be 
further evidence that it is 'minded', but its being 'minded' 
is also not constituted by these two conditions. 
The importance of these considerations comes out when it is 
observed that some contemporary eliminative materialists 
would have us believe that 'having a mind' simply consists in 
having one's behaviour successfully predicted and explained 
in terms of intentional states attributed to one. Paul 
Churchland sums up the view as follows: 
[T]he hypothesis that a specific individual has 
conscious intelligence is also an explanatory 
hypothesis, on this view. And it is plausible 
to the degree that the individual's continuing 
behaviour is best explained and predicted in terms 
of desires, beliefs, perceptions, emotions, and so 
on. Since this is, in fact, the best way to under-
stand the behaviour of most humans, one is therefore 
justified in believing that they are 'other minds'. 
And one will be similarly justified in ascribing 
psychological states to any other creatures or 
machines, so long as such ascriptions sustain the 
most successful explanations and predictions of 
their continuing behaviour (1986:71). 
But what is meant here by "most successful explanations" and 
"best way to understand"? 
I argued in Chapter One that the best exp 1 anation of an event 
is the one that renders that event most strongly in 
explanation, and it seems clear that mechanistic explanations 
of phenomena, insofar as they are based on deterministic 
laws, would be precisely those that render an event most 
strongly in explanation. So where these are available, then 
any other "mentalistic" or intentional explanations could not 
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possibly be the best and most successful explanations we 
have. And this, I think, implies that one cannot really 
believe that a system is 'minded' if one believed that there 
in fact are as yet undiscovered deterministic laws which 
could feature in a complete mechanistic account of its 
behaviour. For .believing that there is such a 
complete mechanistic explanation· of a system's behaviour 
would be enough reason to doubt that it has any mentality at 
all. Of course none of this will give any discomfort to the 
eliminative materialist, for he believes that the hypothesis 
of 'other minds' can be superceded by such a comprehensive 
mechanistic theory. But it should give us pause for 
reflection. For the only way that we can continue to believe 
in 'other minds' in the same sense that we do now, would be 
for us to fail to find such a complete mechanistic account of 
human behaviour. The reason is that it is precisely physical 
indeterminism which allows for the possibility of our 
intentional explanations being hegemonic with respect to any 
underlying mechanistic explanations. 
In reply to the various questions posed about agent-causation 
a few paragraphs back, the rudiments of an answer begin to 
emerge. 
Firstly, we can say that we need to postulate something like 
agent-causality in order to adequately account for the data. 
Decomposing action into a series of passive and separate 
events will not work. 
Secondly, it cannot be expected that we give an analysis of. 
agent-causation if by this is understood saying what the 
various elements are of which it is composed. 
This is precise 1 y what we cannot do, for it would be trying 
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to understand agent-causality on the model of event-
causality. All we can say is that sometimes an agent brings 
about physical events, presumably events in his brain, 
which events are then the cause of the various motions which 
are his intentional action. Thus when John raises his arm in 
order to signal the waiter, and if this indeed is an 
intentional action, then John intentionally brings it about 
that his arm goes up by bringing it about that certain events 
in his brain cause the motion of his arm. He does not 
intentionally bring about the events in his brain - he might 
not even know that he ~~ a brain - but if it is true that he 
raised his arm, then it must be true that he and not some 
other event, even an event involving him such as a desire or 
a nervous impulse, is the cause of those physical events 
which resulted in his arm's going up. 
Al 1 of this, of·course, is stil 1 very obscure. But that 
cannot be an objection to it in itself. Chisholm has argued 
that the very same obscurity and mystery surrounds the 
concept of one event causing another as well. He says: 
The analogous problem, which holds for 'transeunt 
causation', or causation by an event, is this: 'What 
is the difference between saying, of two events A and 
B, that B happened and then A happened, and saying. 
that B's happening was the cause of A's happening?' 
And the only answer that one can give is this - that 
in the one case the agent was the cause of A's 
happening and in the other case event B was the cause 
of A's happening. The nature of transeunt causation is 
no more clear than is that of immanent [(by which he 
means agent)] causation (1982:31). 
Chisholm, I think, has a point here. How indeed are we to 
understand the notion of a 'cause', any sort of 'cause', at 
al 1 ? Al 1 we can say is that one event somehow produces 
another event, and we have our stock of words which describe 
this transaction - pushings, pullings, forcings, makings 
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12 
happen and so forth - but none of them, it seems, can specify 
the essence of this mysterious notion without in some way or 
another involving other notions which already contain the 
13 
primitive notion of a 'cause'. 
14 
Let us rest with the idea that it is unanalysable. 
But how are we to detect the presence of a case of agent-
causality as opposed to a simple case of uncausality 7 
The answer to this, if al 1 that has gone before in this 
discussion is coherent, is clear. For one good reason for 
saying that a piece of behaviour is caused by an agent rather 
than being uncaused is just that there is an intentional 
explanation of its behaviour and its behaviour is physically 
undetermined. It would be too much of a coincidence, I have 
suggested, if a system's behaviour was in fact physically 
undetermined but nevertheless capable of being understood in 
the normal language of human action and its explanation. So 
a case of genuine intentional action - movement brought about 
by an agent - can be distinguished from a case of mere 
movement by finding (a) that the behaviour cannot be 
completely explained mechanistically, and (b) by there being 
an intentional explanation of the behaviour which is 
hegemonic with respect to any partial mechanistic explanation 
of that behaviour. And this is why the behaviour of a 
quantum particle, or of some or other indeterministic 
machine, can never be an intentional action - because an 
12. See Holland 1980:211-228. 
13. Anscombe discusses this in her Inaugural Lecture at 
Cambridge University. See Anscombe 1981B. 
14. See also Richard Taylor 1966:91-92, 112 and 
Thorp 1980:106. 
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intentional explanation of its behaviour would leave us as 
much in the dark as before and it is safer, more explanatory, 
to stick to the physical level of explanation in these cases . 
. And this also explains why there would be no reason to regard 
computers or any other machines we may create as agents or 
'other minds'. The reason is not that we cannot adopt the 
intentional stance toward them, for this we can do, but 
rather that we will know that their behaviour can be 
completely explained mechanistically - for how else are we to 
construct them if not in accordance with physical laws? - and 
this would be enough reason to doubt, so I have argued 
throughout, that they had any mentality or consciousness at 
all. 
The picture I am suggesting obviously has a dualistic ring to 
it. But it need not be seen as a twentieth century version 
of Cartesian dualism which seeks crucial gaps of randomness in 
the causal framework of the world, in our brains, through 
which causally efficacious immaterial agents could be sneaked 
into the picture. 
Agents, on the view I am suggesting, are simply the flesh and 
blood persons we know ourselves to be. Being creatures of 
flesh and blood, we form part of the causal fabric of the 
world which it is the business of physics, chemistry, biology 
and even ecology to describe and explain. But it would 
simply be dogmatism to insist that all behaviour that ever 
was or ever will be can be adequately explained from within 
these levels of description alone. If physical indeterminism 
is true, as I have assumed it is, then that view crumbles. 
The full picture of what constitutes the human reality cannot 
be described from these levels alone. And if these levels 
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are not sufficient to capture the full picture, does 
ascending to higher or different levels therefore commit us 
to postulating a separate reality of immaterial minds or 
agents which from time to time interfere in this physical 
world? I think not. All we need to realise is that we have 
a multi-level led reality which requires a multi-level led 
ontology in order to adequately explain and describe its 
richness. We need to see, as Charles Taylor says, "that 
although some principles govern the behaviour of all things, 
others apply only to some; and yet the. latter cannot be shown 
as special cases of the former" (1985A:l86). 
Agents are creatures of flesh and blood, but the fullness of 
their agency will be missed if looked at from only the 
physical point of view. The pattern emerges at a different 
level, namely the level of our ordinary and common-sense view 
of persons. But this pattern can only emerge, so I have 
tried to argue, if .every element of the total picture is not 
determined by antecedent physical causes which go back 
indefinitely. At some point a different principle is in 
operation, the principle of agency, and failure to see it 
will result in a failure to see the relevant pattern. 
135 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Note: The date after the author's name indicates the date of 
the publication used and not that of the original 
publication. 
(l) ANSCOMBE, G.E.M. 1979. Intention. Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 
(2) ANSCOMBE, G.E.M. 1981. Collected Philosophical Papers 2: 
Metaphysics.and the Philosophy of Mind. 
Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 
(3) ANSCOMBE, G.E.M. 1981A. "A Reply to c.s. Lewis' Argument 
that Naturalism is Self-Defeating" in 
(2) above. 
(4) ANSCOMBE, G.E.M. 1981B. "Causality and Determination" in 
(2) above. 
(5) ARMSTRONG, D.M. 1981. The Nature of Mind. Harvester Press, 
Sussex, England. 
(6) AYER, A.J. 1964. The Concept of a Person and Other Essays. 
MacMillan and Co, London. 
(7) AYER, A.J. 1982. "Freedom and Necessity" in (114) below. 
(8) BAKER, L.R. 1981. "Why Computers Can't Act" in American 
Philosophical Quarterly, 18:2. 
(9) BENNETT,J. 1976. Linguistic Behaviour. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
(10) BISHOP, J. 1981. "Peacocke on Intentional Action" in 
Analysis, 41. 
(11) BISHOP, J. 1983. "Agent-Causation" in Mind 92. 
(12) BODEN, M.A. 1978. Purposive Explanation in Psychol_2gy. 
Harvester Press, Sussex. 
136 
( 13) BOYLE, J.1976. (with GRIZES, G. and TOLLEFSEN, o. ). Free 
Choice: A Self-Referential Argument. 
University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 
Indiana. 
(14) CHISHOLM, R. 1976. "The Agent as Cause" in Action Theory. 
(eds. Brand, M. and Yelton, D.) Reidel, 
Dordrecht. 
(15) CHISHOLM, R. 1982. "Human Freedom and the Self" in 
(114) below. 
(16) CHURCHLAND, P. 1986. Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified 
Science of the Mind-Brain. Bradford 
Books, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
(17) CHURCHLAND, P. 1986. Matter and Consciousness. 
M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
(18) DANTO, A. 1965. "Basic Actions" in American 
Philosophical Quarterly, 2. 
(19) DAVIDSON, D. 1980. (1) Essays on Actions and Events. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
(20) DAVIDSON, D. 1980A. "Actions, Reasons and Causes" in 
(21) DAVIDSON, D. 
(22) DAVIDSON, D. 
(23) DAVIDSON, D. 
(24) DAVIDSON, D. 
(25) DAVIDSON, D. 








"Mental Events" in (19) above. 
"Agency" in (19) above. 
"Intending" in (19) above. 
"The Material Mind" in (19) above. 
"Psychology as Philosophy" in (19) 
1980G. "Hempel on Explaining Action" in 
( 19) above .. 
(27) DAVIDSON, D. 1980H. "Causal Relations" in (19) above. 
(28) DAVIDSON, D. 1980I. " The Individuation of Events" in 
(19) above. 
137 
(29) DAVIDSON, D. 1980J. "Freedom to Act" in (19) above. 
(30) DAVIDSON, D. 1982. "Paradoxes of ·Irrationality" in 
Philosophical Essays on Freud. (eds. 
Wollheim, R. and Hopkins, J.) Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
(31) DAVIDSON, D. 1985. "Deception and Division" in Actioris 
and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy 
of Donald Davidson. (eds. LePore, E. and 
McClaughlin, B.) Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 
(32) DENNETT, D. 1973. "Mechanism and Responsibility" in 
(49) below. 
(33) DENNETT, D. 1979. Brainstorms. Hassocks, Sussex. 
(34) DENNETT, D. 1986. "I Could Not Have Done Otherwise - So 
What?" in Journal of Philosophy 81. 
(35) DRETSKE, F. 1985. "Machines and the Mental" in 
Proceedings and Addresses of the American 
Philosophical Association 59:1. 
(36) ECCLES, J. 1983. (with POPPER, K.) The Self and its 
Brain. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. 
(37) ECCLES, J. 1984. The Human Mystery. Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, London~ 
(38) EWIN, R.E. 1968. "Actions, Brain-Processes and 
Determinism" in Mind 77. 
(39) FERRE, F. 1973. "Self~Determinism" in American 
Philosophical Quarterly 10:3. 
(40) FLEW, A. 1978. A Rational Animal. Oxford University 
Press, Oxford. 
(41) FODOR, J. 1968. Psychological Explanation. Random 
House, New York. 
(42) FRANKFURT, H. 1978. "The Problem of Action" in American 
Philosophical Quarterly 15:2. 
138 
(43) GOLDMAN, A. 1970. A Theory of Human Action. Prentice-
Hall, New Jersey. 
(44) HAMPSHIRE, s. 1959. Thought and Action. Chatto and 
Windus, London. 
(45) HEMPEL, C. 1965. Aspects of Scientific Explanation. 
Free Press, New York. 
(46) HEMPEL, C. 1966. Philosophy of Natural Science. 
Prentice-Hall, New Jersey. 
(47) HESS, P.H. 1981. "Actions, Reasons and Humean Causes" 
in Analysis 41. 
(48) HOLLAND, R.F. 1980. Against Empiricism. Basil 
Blackwell, Oxford. 
(49) HONDERICH, T. (ed.) 1973. Essays on Freedom of Action. 
Routledge and Kean Paul, London. 
(50) HONDERICH, T. 1982. "The Argument for Anomalous Monism" 
in Analysis 42. 
(51) HONDERICH, T. 1983. "Anomalous Monism: Reply to Smith" 
in Analysis 43. 
(52) HONDERICH, T. 1984. "Smith and the Champion of Mauve" 
. in Analysis 44. 
(53) KENNY, A.J.P. 1963. Action, Emotion and Will. 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. 
(54) KENNY, A.J.P. 1973. "Freedom, Spontaneity and 
Indifference" in (49) above. 
(55) KIM, J. 1966. "On the Psycho-Physical Identity Theory" 
in American Philosophical Quarterly 3. 
(56) LEVIN, M. 1979. Metaphysics and the Mind-Body Problem. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
(57) LEWIS, C.S. 1964. Miracles. Collins Fontana, London. 
139 
(58) LONG, D. 1979. "Agents, Mechanisms and Other Minds" in 
Body, Mind and Method .. (eds. Gustafson, D. 
and Tapscott, B.) Reidel, Dordrecht. 
(59) LUCAS, J.R. 1970. The Freedom of the Will. Oxford 
.University Press, London. 
(60) MACINTYRE, A. 1957. "Determinism" in Mind 66. 
(61) MACINTYRE, A. 1960. ncommitment and Objectivity" in 
The Sociological Review no. 3. 
(62) MADELL, G. 1986. "Neurophilosophy: A Principled 
Sceptic's Response" in Inquiry 29:2. . ' 
(63) MALCOLM, N. 1968. "The Conceivability of Mechanism" in 
The Philosophical Review 78:1. 
(64) MATSON, W. 1976. Sentience. University of California 
Press, Berkeley. 
(65) McGINN, C. 1979. "Action and its Explanation" in 
Philosophical Problems in Psychology. 
(ed. Bolton, N.) Methuen, London. 
(£6) McGINN, C. 1982. The Character of Mind. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford. 
(67) MEEHL, P. 1966. "The Compleat- Autocerebroscopist" in 
Mind, Matter and Method. (eds. Feyerabend. 
P. and Maxwell, G.) University of Minnesota 
Press, Minneapolis. 
(68) MELCHERT, N. 1986. "What's· Wrong with Anomalous 
Monism?" in Journal of Philosophy 83:5. 
(69) MELDEN, A.I. 1961. Free Action. Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, London. 
(70) MEYERSON TAYLOR, D. 1982. "Actions, Reasons and Causal 
Explanations" in Analysis 42. 
(71) MULLANE, H. 1971. "Psychoanalytic Explanation and 
Rationalityn in Journal of Philosophy 68. 
140 
(72) NAGEL, E. 1971. The Structure of Science. Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, London. 
(73) NAGEL, T. 1974. "What is it like to be a Bat'?" in 
The PhilOSOJ2hical Review 83. 
(74) NAGEL, T. 19-79. "Moral Luck" in Mortal Questions. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
(75) O'CONNOR, D.J. 1971. Free Will. Doubleday Anchor, 
New York. 
(76) PEACOCKE, C. 1979. Holistic Explanation: Action, Space, 
Interpretation. Clarendon Press, Oxford.· 
(77) PEARS, D. (ed.) 1963. Freedom and the. Will. 
MacMillan, London. 
(78) PEARS, D. 1973. "Rational Explanation of Actions and 
Psychological Determinism" in (49) above. 
(79) PETERS, R.S. 1958. The Concept of Motivation 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. 
(80) PLATO 1954. The Last Days of Socrates. Penguin. 
(81) POPPER, K. 1983. (with ECCLES, J.) The Self and its 
Brain. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. 
(82) PUTNAM, H. 1974. "Reductionism and the Nature of 
Psychology" in Cognition 2:1. 
(83) RICHMAN, R.J. 1969. "Reasons and Causes: Some Puzzles" 
in Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47:1. 
(84) ROBINSON, H. 1982. Matter and Sense. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
(85) ROBINSON, w. 1979. "Do Pains Make a Difference to our 
Behaviour?" in American Philosophical 
Quarterly 16:4. 
(86) RORTY, R. 1965. "Mind-Body Identity, Privacy and 
Categories" in Review of Metaphysics 19. 
141 
(87) RYLE, G. 1980. The Concept of Mind. Penguin, Harmonds-
worth, England. 
(88) SCARROW, D. 1981. "The Causality of Reasons: A Survey 
of Some Recent Developments in the Mind-
Body Problem" in Metaphilosophy 12:1. 
(89) SHAFFER, J. 1968. Philosophy of Mind. Prentice-Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey. 
(90) SHERIDAN, G. 1982. "Can There be Moral Subjects in a 
Physicalistic Universe" in Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 43. 
(91) SHUTTE, A. 1984. "The Refutation of Determinism" in 
Philosophy 59:230. 
(92) SKILLEN, A. 1984. "Mind and Matter: A Problem that 
Refuses Dissolution" in Mind 93. 
(93) SMART, J.J.C. 1959. "Sensations and Brain Processes" in 
The Philosophical Review 68. 
(94) SMART, J.J.C. 1963. Philosophy and Scientific Realism. 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. , 
(95) SMITH, P. 1981. "Hess on Reasons and Causes" in 
Analysis 41. 
(96). SMITH, P. 1984. "Anomalous Monism and Epiphenomenalism: 
A Reply to Honderich" in Analysis 44. 
(97) STEINER, M. 1986. "Events and Causality" in Journal of 
Philosophy 83:5. 
(98) STRAWSON, P.F. 1980. Freedom and Resentment and Other 
Essays. Methuen, London. 
(99) SUPPES, F. 1974. Probabilistic Metaphysics·. University 
of Uppsala Press, Uppsala. 
(100) SWINBURNE, R. 1979. The Existence of God. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford. 
142 
(101) SWINBURNE, R. 1982. "Are Mental Events Identical with 
Brain Events .. in American Philosophical 
Quarterly 19. 
( 102) SWINBURNE,· R. 1986. "The Indeterminism of Human 
Actions" in MidWest Studies in 
~hilosophy 10. 
(103) SWINBURNE, R. 1986A. The Evolution of the Soul. 
Clarendon Press, Oxford. 
(104) TAYLOR, C. 1964. The Explanation of Behaviour. 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. 
(105) TAYLOR, C. 1970. "The Explanation of Purposive 
Behaviour" in Explanation in the 
Behavioural Sciences. (eds. Borger, R. and 
Cioffi, F.) Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
(106) TAYLOR, C. 1985. Human Agency and Language: Philo-
sophical Papers vol.l. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
(107) TAYLOR, C. 1985A. "How is Mechanism Conceivable" 
in (106) above. 
(108) TAYLOR, C. 1985B. "Cognitive Psychology" in (106) 
above. 
(109) TAYLOR, R. 1966. Action and furpose. Prentice-Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey. 
(110) TAYLOR, R. 1983. Metaphysics. Prentice-Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey. 
(111) THORP, J. 1980. Free Will: A Defence Against Neuro-
physiological Determinism. Routledge and 
Kagan Paul, London. 
143 
(112) TOULMIN, S. 1970. "Reasons and Causes" in Explanation 
in the Behavioural Sciences. (eds. Borger, 
R. and Cioffi, F.) Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge. 
(113) VAN INWAGEN, P. 1983. An Essay on Free Will. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford. 
(114) WATSON, G. (ed.) 1982. Free Will. Oxford University 
Press, Oxford. 
(115) WIGGINS, D. 1973. "Towards a Reasonable Libertarianism" 
in (49) above. 
(116) WINCH, P. 1980. The Idea of a Social Science. 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. 
(117) WHITELEY, C.H. 1968. "Mental Causes" in Royal Institute 
of Philosophy Lectures vol.l (1966-67) : The 
Human Agent. 
(118) WHITELEY, C.H. 1973. Mind in Action. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford. 
(119) WRIGHT, L. 1976. Teleological Explanations. 
University of California Press, Berkeley. 
144 
8 AUG 1988 ,. 
